Guerrilla Strategy Against Incumbents

“In a straight-up fight, it would be no contest. "If it was good-old- boy, Corporate America, tee 'ime at Augusta, we weren't going to win," says Perry. "We knew that. We knew we had to change the game. We had to be in a game where vision, strategy, other things were impor- tant." Like the Vietcong guerrilla forces, the McCaw team would try to force a more powerful adversary to play by unfamiliar rules, to make the game messy and embarrassing until it was forced to withdraw.”

“The McCaw strategy involved sending several different messages: to convince LIN shareholders that the better deal was with McCaw; to persuade others in the cellular industry that McCaw was the better steward of LIN's critical licenses; and to build pressure on BellSouth through political means and by convincing them they were in a fight with a ruthless opponent. Normally eager to avoid reporters, McCaw started sending signals through the news media that he wanted LIN at practically any price. McCaw compared his company to anti-imperial Scottish warriors, the Islamic Jihad, and the anti-Soviet Afghan rebels. "We want them to think we're maniacs," he told Forbes magazine. He sent John Stanton, Rufus Lumry, and other McCaw executives on a worldwide trip to raise money from bankers who were privately assured that McCaw would make no crazy offers. The group raised $5.5 billion—proof that Craig McCaw was not dependent on Michael Milken, who was about to have serious trouble with the law. Meanwhile, on Wall Street, the McCaw team tried to raise doubts about BellSouth's offer by pointing out the Material Adverse Change (MAC) clause in the Baby Bell's offer. Routinely used by many compa- nies in buyout offers, the MAC clause allowed the cautious BellSouth an out if problems erupted. The McCaw company had similar outs in its offer, but the team stressed how long Bells usually took to close deals compared to McCaw's history of rapid closures. A slow-as-molasses Baby Bell deal, they implied, stood a good chance of triggering the MAC clause and killing the whole arrangement. Other McCaw aides tried to make political trouble for BellSouth, telling state regulators that the LIN deal would drive up local charges or violate agreements. Two U.S. senators from Washington State agreed to introduce a bill to block BellSouth. Then came McCaw's flanking maneuver, what Perry calls "the beginning of the end" for BellSouth.”