A. E. Wishon

"Kaiser was unconvinced by industry representatives’ claims that, with plants operating at 28 percent of capacity in the throes of the Depression, price fixing was inconceivable. 69 However, he was so busy with dams and other jobs in 1933 that he postponed building his own cement plant. Losing the Shasta job provided him the incentive he needed. The “Big Five” cement producers confidently expected a lucrative contract at Shasta; who could challenge them? Kaiser entered the list. Time was one ally; he knew it would be more than a year before Pacific Constructors required cement deliveries at Shasta. Still, Bureau of Reclamation officials were incredulous when Kaiser informed them he intended to bid on the cement contract. From his office in Denver, Chief Engineer R. F. Walter opposed Kaiser’s plan on several counts. His most significant objection was based on disbelief that a single plant could maintain steady deliveries of cement over three years, in the face of possible labor problems, machinery breakdowns, and faulty batches of cement. Kaiser noted that the bureau planned to obtain sand, gravel, and other materials from single suppliers; if the chief’s logic applied to him, it should also affect other potential vendors. Bureau engineers also stressed that Kaiser had neither experience nor a cement plant. 70 Kaiser informed Walters that he had already taken steps to enter the industry. Engineers located plentiful limestone deposits along Permanente Creek in Santa Clara County, and Kaiser leased the land with an option to purchase. Kaiser’s assistants also arranged financing from the Bank of America for plant construction, and arranged with railroads for delivery to Redding, which was close to Shasta. 71 Kaiser faced a tough battle persuading government officials to take him seriously, but he had one significant advantage. West Coast cement suppliers had established a pattern of submitting nearly identical bids on contracts. Kaiser learned that this practice had alienated Ickes, who abhorred even the hint of price-fixing. A month before bids were opened, Kaiser presented a list of the “monopoly’s” trangressions to Ickes’ office. In addition to its usual activities, the cement trust had allegedly interfered with construction of his cement plant, organizing neighborhood protests against his planned facility, pressuring railroads to hike rates for shipment of Kaiser’s cement, and engaging in other restraints of trade. 72 Despite Kaiser’s bold initiative, industry officials were still surprised at the outcome of the bidding for cement at Shasta in the summer of 1939. The West Coast combine came in at $ 1.41 per barrel, close to negotiated prices on many other jobs. They were shocked when Kaiser bid $ 1.19 per barrel and tried to convince bureau officials that accepting Kaiser’s bid was far too risky. Bureau officials wavered. Combine leadership included some of the West Coast’s most powerful men: A. E. Wishon of Pacific Gas and Electric; George Cameron, publisher of the San Francisco Chronicle; and others. Yet government officials signed papers in June 1939 for $ 6.9 million worth of cement from Kaiser. A few years later, a California railroad man observed: “If Kaiser’s life can be said to have a turning point, it was then. He licked a tough bunch. From then on, he wasn’t afraid to tackle anything.”"

"Kaiser was unconvinced by industry representatives’ claims that, with plants operating at 28 percent of capacity in the throes of the Depression, price fixing was inconceivable. 69 However, he was so busy with dams and other jobs in 1933 that he postponed building his own cement plant. Losing the Shasta job provided him the incentive he needed. The “Big Five” cement producers confidently expected a lucrative contract at Shasta; who could challenge them? Kaiser entered the list. Time was one ally; he knew it would be more than a year before Pacific Constructors required cement deliveries at Shasta. Still, Bureau of Reclamation officials were incredulous when Kaiser informed them he intended to bid on the cement contract. From his office in Denver, Chief Engineer R. F. Walter opposed Kaiser’s plan on several counts. His most significant objection was based on disbelief that a single plant could maintain steady deliveries of cement over three years, in the face of possible labor problems, machinery breakdowns, and faulty batches of cement. Kaiser noted that the bureau planned to obtain sand, gravel, and other materials from single suppliers; if the chief’s logic applied to him, it should also affect other potential vendors. Bureau engineers also stressed that Kaiser had neither experience nor a cement plant.70 Kaiser informed Walters that he had already taken steps to enter the industry. Engineers located plentiful limestone deposits along Permanente Creek in Santa Clara County, and Kaiser leased the land with an option to purchase. Kaiser’s assistants also arranged financing from the Bank of America for plant construction, and arranged with railroads for delivery to Redding, which was close to Shasta.71 Kaiser faced a tough battle persuading government officials to take him seriously, but he had one significant advantage. West Coast cement suppliers had established a pattern of submitting nearly identical bids on contracts. Kaiser learned that this practice had alienated Ickes, who abhorred even the hint of price-fixing. A month before bids were opened, Kaiser presented a list of the “monopoly’s” trangressions to Ickes’ office. In addition to its usual activities, the cement trust had allegedly interfered with construction of his cement plant, organizing neighborhood protests against his planned facility, pressuring railroads to hike rates for shipment of Kaiser’s cement, and engaging in other restraints of trade.72 Despite Kaiser’s bold initiative, industry officials were still surprised at the outcome of the bidding for cement at Shasta in the summer of 1939. The West Coast combine came in at $1.41 per barrel, close to negotiated prices on many other jobs. They were shocked when Kaiser bid $1.19 per barrel and tried to convince bureau officials that accepting Kaiser’s bid was far too risky. Bureau officials wavered. Combine leadership included some of the West Coast’s most powerful men: A. E. Wishon of Pacific Gas and Electric; George Cameron,…"