Entity Dossier
entity

Bob Smith

Strategic Concepts & Mechanics

Risk DoctrineNo Cross-Pledging of Crown Jewels
Signature MoveDeals Hated, Strategy Loved
Signature MoveNever Run Out of Cheque-Writing Time
Relationship LeverageShare the Pie to Keep the Table
Strategic PatternEcho Bay Model Then Surpass It
Signature MoveKlosters Mountain as Strategic War Room
Identity & CultureRefugee Hunger as Permanent Engine
Cornerstone MoveWritten Memo Then Unanimous Sign-Off
Identity & CultureReturn to Canada Only With Success
Cornerstone MoveBuy Producing Assets at Cycle Bottom, Never Explore
Signature MoveTrust Mining Operators Then Stay Away
Operating PrincipleFocus as Compensation for Ordinary Talent
Cornerstone MoveBorrow Against the Asset to Buy the Asset
Decision FrameworkGeopolitical Disruption as Buy Signal
Strategic PatternScarcity Premium as Entry Signal
Signature MoveControl Without Majority Ownership

Primary Evidence

"The Mercur mine in Utah was Munk’s next acquisition target, and Bob Smith was front and centre in the decision to go for it. Mercur was owned by Texaco, but had originally been developed by the mining arm of Getty Oil Company. With permission from Texaco White Plains’ senior executive, Peter Byur (later Texaco’s chairman and CEO), Munk sent his newly acquired Camflo team of mining engineers to do a two-day appraisal of Mercur. Bob Smith, the chief, took two of his Camflo geologists with him, Brian Meikle, a McGill graduate, and Alan Hill, a former Noranda mine manager. Smith and his team liked what they saw. Mercur was producing 70,000 ounces a year, but Smith reported that production could be increased dramatically, that the base cost per ounce could be lowered just as dramatically, and that he could run the mine much more efficiently."

Source:The Golden Phoenix : A Biography of Peter Munk

"unk’s strategic thinking shifted into high gear. As his inves| \ / tigation and research progressed, he became convinced that even with its mountain of debt Camflo would bring new credibility to Barrick Resources. The key factor was that Camflo was producing gold in significant quantities, and had acknowledged and reputable management under Bob Smith, whereas the Renabie production was only 16,000 ounces in 1984. Munk needed gold production against which he could obtain major financing."

Source:The Golden Phoenix : A Biography of Peter Munk

"Peter Munk had never seen the gold mine he fought so hard to buy. His decision to go for it was based on his faith and trust in his mining team. As soon as the deal was closed, Munk says, Bob Smith went out with his people, Dr. Meikle and Alan Hill. They started to drill and they became very excited. They wouldnt’ tell me how excited they were because I don’t know anything about drill holes. At the point Barrick took over Camflo, Bob and his people had little credibility. There was nothing but friction at Camflo. So I had to learn by experience, and my confidence in them grew over the years as they performed and I realized how brilliant they were, and how much integrity they had. But at that time, if they had said to me that we had a billion-dollar mine there in Goldstrike, believe me, I would have run for the hills!"

Source:The Golden Phoenix : A Biography of Peter Munk

"Munk needed a tried-and-true gold mining operator in his search for producing mines with potential for increased production and reserves. And Bob Smith was it."

Source:The Golden Phoenix : A Biography of Peter Munk

"During the remainder of 1987, Munk focused on raising capital for American Barrick Resources. He left the mining development to Bob Smith and his professionals. Munk and Gilmour, with their expert number-cruncher partner, Bill Birchall, would orchestrate the money mining."

Source:The Golden Phoenix : A Biography of Peter Munk

"At breakfast in Klosters on the morning of December 20, Peter Munk reviewed with great satisfaction the fax that had arrived from his financial people, Jerry Garbutt and Greg Wilkins, on the matter of Goldstrike development financing. Munk’s team recommended that, of the two banks submitting offers—the Toronto-Dominion Group and the Union Bank of Switzerland Group—the lead mandate be awarded to the UBS group, which offered US$441 million secured against 1,050,000 ounces of gold over eight years, extendable to eleven years. There it was, a commitment for US$441 million, which, according to Bob Smith, would turn the little mine called Goldstrike into North America’s top gold producer."

Source:The Golden Phoenix : A Biography of Peter Munk

"Gold: The First Free-Trade Commodity 243 of the Hill plan, but also about the projected costs and budgets. Once Goldstrike was fully up and running he could leave the day-to-day operations to his totally reliable Bob Smith and the financial gatekeeper, Jerry Garbutt."

Source:The Golden Phoenix : A Biography of Peter Munk

"Gerry Schwartz and Anthony and those guys look at six deals a week! I hate deals. When I do deals, it upsets me, makes me nervous. I always feel that I’m going to make a mistake. I do them to attain my strategic objectives. It sometimes takes a few deals to get there. But I never do a deal per se. I hate it! It’s a totally different mentality. Yes, I did Lac, but God save me from another Lac. And yet I'll do one next year again— maybe because I have to—for getting Barrick in position. But its a different mindset. Their business is to look at deals, like investment bankers. Gerry’s background was as an investment banker. Anthony had some time at First Boston, the investment bankers. I like people like Bill Birchall and Greg Wilkins and Bob Smith, who have run a business for twenty or thirty years and build permanent entities and value for their shareholders. Different mentality."

Source:The Golden Phoenix : A Biography of Peter Munk

Appears In Volumes