Bolloré

""Vincent led this operation with all the cunning of a peasant from the Millevaches plateau, who takes out his beast, shows it at the market, brings it back to the farm, and lets the rumor swell," appreciates this close associate of Bolloré, who knows the region well. Let's judge: in 2007, Vivendi already wanted to sell Universal Music to reduce its debt, and found no one to buy the company, which was nevertheless the world leader, at the proposed price of 7 billion euros; in 2014, with the first encouraging results of streaming, Jean-René Fourtou had received an offer of 13 billion; not expensive enough, Bolloré believes, "Universal can go on its own for 25 billion"; indeed, in 2018, Oddo-BHF bank surprised with an estimate of 20 billion; and, two years later, the sale of the first two 10% tickets of Universal will be based on 30, then 33 billion; before the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, on the day of the listing in September 2021, exploded its valuation to... 45 billion euros. More than the market capitalization of Vivendi, when it still owned this exceptional asset!""

"It must be said that when it comes to ambition, Bolloré is abundantly endowed. By 1999, he had already successively swallowed up Scac, taken a bite out of Delmas-Vieljeux, plundered the Rivaud group, and taken a big chunk of the assets from the Seydoux and David-Weill families... Not to mention his raid against Martin Bouygues, a member of Entreprise et Cité, foreshadowing the ability of the big predators to devour each other."

"Bolloré is already speaking like Séguéla's tycoon: "We want to invest in the media in France, maybe tomorrow in Europe," he tells Challenges. "Not out of fascination, but out of interest in these industries and a concern to prolong the group beyond 2022, the date I have set for my departure. To interest my heirs, it is better to be in a growing field that they find interesting.""

"It must be said that the holder of the second greatest fortune in the world has enough to impress, even Bolloré, twenty times less endowed, according to Challenges' ranking. The latter acknowledges it with humor, when he says to those around him: "He is truly stronger than me. If I had invested the money I earned in LVMH stocks, I would be much richer...". However, the two billionaires started their journey almost at the same time, in the early 1980s, following very parallel paths, without almost ever crossing paths: they are only known to have one common investment, before Lagardère: the music channel Mezzo, acquired on a 50/ 50 basis by Les Échos (owned by LVMH) and Canal +, in July 2019. But for the rest, what similarities!"

"Here are two entrepreneurs who are also heirs; who have tremendously developed what they inherited, even though Férinel's real estate was in much better condition than Bolloré's papers; who each identified a sleeping beauty (Dior, within the Boussac empire, for Arnault, and Rivaud bank for Bolloré); who followed the advice of the same godfather in the Parisian establishment-Antoine Bernheim-to finance their rise to power; who ensured the construction of their empire through a very unusual blend of entrepreneurial aggression and ability to leverage new financial market instruments; who experienced both failures and windfalls (Gucci for Arnault and Bouygues for Bolloré); who moved into the new century without forgetting how to wield hostility (Hermès and Havas learned this to their detriment); who practiced financial engineering with incredible dexterity-Arnault increased his share of LVMH's capital from 38% to 46% in one day, crushing the Christian Dior holding, while Bolloré reached 27% in Vivendi, thanks in large part to the billions inherited from the opportune merger of the communication group with Havas; and who, finally, share the same dynastic ambition, a fierce determination to firmly establish this resolutely familial choice over time. In fact, it is the defense of family capitalism that is the cause of their joint presence in Lagardère's capital, and the potential source of a collision..."

""Let me introduce you to my associate," Bolloré even said to Michel Drucker, crossing paths with the boss of Marianne at the restaurant Marius et Jeannette, on Avenue George-V in Paris. And then nothing... The negotiations got lost in the limbo of postponed meetings and unanswered phone calls. A specialty of the entrepreneur, defended by his close associates in this way: "He's so polite that he's reluctant to say no." Except to his collaborators, of course..."

""His group had made the takeover bid for Delmas without looking into the belly of the beast," remembers the former advisor to Pompidou today, modestly specifying his role: "To demonstrate that, if there were temporary difficulties, in the long term Bolloré would regain full strength. And above all, to reassure the twenty or so bankers to protect the group from any nasty surprises when the deadlines come."

""Once again, a fool goes to fetch the fox and opens the henhouse door for him, mocks a knowledgeable expert, both in the media and in the Bolloré method (see Chapter V). And not content with bringing him in, he divests himself of his limited partnership company, which protected the entire system, in exchange for a plate of lentils: by promising Arnaud to remain CEO of Lagardère for a six-year term, with all the related remuneration elements, Vincent removes the final obstacle to his control and can launch his takeover bid." However, it is not certain that, once the takeover bid is completed, the very stingy Bolloré will let Lagardère maintain its current lifestyle, estimated at 1 million euros per month in the company's accounts..."

"Now emerges "Bolloré, the sea wolf," revealed in L'Express. The young entrepreneur is not only the savior heir, the convincing negotiator, and the social boss: he is also a killer. "Tristan Vieljeux was convinced that he would drive us to bankruptcy," Bolloré justified at the time. "But we counterattacked by focusing on his fragmented capital, the company's weak point." With the family tree of the Protestant family constantly on his desk, Vincent slowly brought them all down, starting with the heiress, Francine, who was married to an executive fired by Tristan, until the cousin Jacques, who didn't want to be the last one to board "the Sperm Whale," a nickname given by the raider to the shipowner. By the end of May 1991, Tristan Vieljeux surrendered, and the fleet of around fifty boats would now fly the Bolloré flag."

""We always invest in batteries," Cyrille can therefore assert at Bolloré's general meeting on May 26, 2021. But the new CEO does not fail to specify to the shareholders that the annual losses of the "electricity storage" activity will decrease from 400 to 100 million euros. It's as if the son has finally convinced the father to calm his enthusiasm. And make him forget his favorite trick to justify the billions invested in batteries: "If we succeed, we will be very rich. If we fail, we will still be very rich because we will stop spending hundreds of millions per year.""

"Lagardère, the heir, has been in trouble for two years with Amber Fund, which has been causing him trouble from London, fearing losing the majority of votes at its general assembly in the following May. Nothing fatal, as Lagardère is protected by a rare limited partnership status. But he may have to give up positions as directors that were previously de facto reserved for friends. Bolloré senses the "circumstance" and therefore takes "action": he acquires a 10% stake in Lagardère through Vivendi, which he controls."

"So let's summarize: since entering Vivendi in 2012, the Bolloré group has received 660 million euros in Vivendi shares for its TNT channels, 1.34 billion euros in dividends, the equivalent of 1.4 billion euros saved through capital reductions, 2.4 billion euros through the acquisition of 60% of Havas, and a final asset of 8 billion euros in UMG shares. In total: nearly 14 billion euros that have benefited Bolloré during this prodigious decade. Of course, to enable this succession of operations, it was necessary to take risks and invest: tens of millions of euros to initially finance the annual losses of the TNT channels, hundreds of millions of euros to establish an impregnable position in Havas, and billions to strengthen their position in Vivendi. The true cost of Bolloré's takeover of Vivendi, Vincent Bolloré keeps to himself, likely between 3 and 4 billion euros. On the other hand, he has already earned three or four times more... and he still holds his 27% stake in Vivendi, even if it has become smaller. Hats off to the artist!"

"The big operations can resume. Claude Bébéar, the founder of insurer Axa who had supported Bolloré a lot in his raid on Delmas, and had supported him "two or three times during difficult periods," was about to be served: "I like Vincent's conquering side. In rugby, I like these agile breakthroughs by the backs, and it doesn't matter if sometimes they are stopped. Vincent, too, knows how to stop.""

"money is considered a raw material that needs to be identified, exploited, developed, and valued. Here are some figures to testify to that. This first participation in Vivendi represents the equivalent of 360 million euros, much higher than the sums invested by Bolloré in his two TNT channels. To increase its power and reach the 5% stake that will open the doors to the supervisory board, this time more than 700 million euros from Bolloré's treasury must be withdrawn. And around 3 billion euros in the following years to reach the threshold of 15%, which will change everything, with the allocation of double voting rights and the promise of comfortable future dividends-600 million euros of exceptional distribution from 2015, at the time of the sale of SFR, and then between 100 and 200 million euros that will come in every fiscal year into the coffers of its largest shareholder, as it climbs up the capital."

"Starting with the simplest tool to strengthen a capital position without spending money: capital reduction. All companies-large or small-resort to it, but none with the consistency of Vivendi. From 2015 onwards, more than 200 million shares repurchased by Vivendi were cancelled in four stages, mechanically reducing the number of its shares by 13%. If these operations-which benefit all shareholders, let's be clear-had not been carried out, Bolloré would have had to spend a whopping additional 1.4 billion euros (at the average exchange rate for 2021) to reach the same 27% stake that he currently controls."

""With Bolloré, everything that is not absolutely forbidden-and punished-is allowed, and it doesn't matter if it leads to disapproval," summarizes one administrator, who explains how the board convinced itself that Bolloré lied to them: "When he tells us 'I have 3% of the capital and I'll stop at 6%,' he is already at 9%. When we ask for an explanation, he goes up to 11%. We point it out to him, and he replies: 'Don't worry, I'll stop at 15%.' As a result, he is ultimately at 29.9%!""

""Bolloré is a solipsist," explains the inventor of Lebreton. Solipsism? "The concept that the self, with its sensations and feelings, constitutes the only existing reality that one can be sure of,""

"Just a few months later, unexpectedly: Vivendi refuses to honor the contract. The late Antoine Bernheim would probably have said, "the bride had the pox"... The very courteous Arnaud de Puyfontaine, CEO of Vivendi, may have expressed it a little less cavalierly (" We thought we were buying a Ferrari, and we end up with a Fiat Punto"), but the statement sent chills down the spines in Milan. And yet, it wasn't far from the truth: Mediaset Premium, supposedly losing 70 million in 2015, suddenly found itself on a trajectory of 200 million negative result each year. Almost as much as Canal in France! A nightmare that Vivendi did not want to replicate. Faced with this turnaround, the Italians sue for breach of contract, seeking 570 million euros in damages, then even 3 billion... Bolloré obviously retaliates, and in November, Vivendi declares itself "freed from its willingness to prioritize an amicable solution." It's war. And Bolloré is going to use its classic arsenal: the attack on the capital."

"When placed, with a professional heritage of 585 million francs, not even the equivalent of 100 million euros. He had then turned around the family business, established a presence in Africa, and acquired the ship owner Delmas-Vieljeux. But the group was heavily indebted, and a respected financier-Bernard Ésambert, former industrial advisor to Georges Pompidou-had to be called upon to calm the concerns of the twenty or so banks that were keeping a close eye on their Bolloré account like a hawk."

"indeed, this definition captures the unreadable Bolloré who decides everything, the unrepentant raider who launches his operations by tapping alone on his mobile phone, the leader who disregards all the group's bodies by his absence, but is very present on the bridge, in his sixth-floor office at Vivendi..."

"A succession of moves that Bolloré would theorize in the 1990s through the principle of the "ten baskets": the group was built on ten branches (plastic film, port activity, maritime shipping, oil logistics, plastic tubes, tobacco, plantations...), between which there is little synergy-except Africa-but which are capable of supporting each other in case of misfortune for either one. A precautionary measure to avoid the industrial accident that his father and uncles had experienced with the family paper mill."

"energy, Bolloré summarized his group as follows: "The recurring businesses, which are rarely talked about, generate annual revenues of 400 to 450 million euros. We extract from this 250 to 300 million to invest in future-oriented projects." Africa in the 1980s, Rivaud in the 1990s, media with the turn of the century... And always energy storage. "We invest where no one else goes," Vincent Bolloré repeats tirelessly, to justify the family lock on the capital and "the stability of its shareholding, which allows it to pursue a long-term investment policy," as stated on the first page of Bolloré's annual report. "Without that, I would have been fired three times already," adds the entrepreneur more bluntly, who believes-rightly-that conventional investors would never have followed him in the attack on Delmas-Vieljeux, the raid on Bouygues, or the crazy bet on batteries: no less than 3 billion euros invested over the past twenty-five years in energy storage!"

"At one time, at Bolloré, it was called the helicopter method. For six months, a year if necessary, he occupies the former boss's office, settles in the midst of the teams, and watches everything, controls everything. After taking control of Havas, whose headquarters happened to be adjacent to the Bolloré Tower on the banks of the Seine, he had two walkways built, jokingly justifying this double investment: "That way, you'll never know where I'm coming from!" Today, the metaphor of the helicopter has also gone digital: "I dive into a subject like Google Earth.""

""Vincent perceives weak signals, he has a different bandwidth than other entrepreneurs to grasp at what stage of the cycle we are", emphasizes Denis Kessler, the president of Scor, who has seen him in action from Bolloré's board of directors, where he sat for ten years, and whose analysis is always based on his background as a doctor in economics. He had noticed that after the boom in global transport, linked to China's accession to the World Trade Organization, ship orders had been too numerous, and anticipated that the market would turn."

"Because Bolloré is part of those Great Beasts, as Christophe Labarde called them in his book, who, despite being predators, are still patriotic."

"In the spring of 1992, Crédit Lyonnais was practically printing money. They had advanced 500 million francs to Tapie to buy Adidas, 600 million to Bolloré, taken 20% of one of Arnault's leading holdings for 520 million, and, among other generous acts, came to the aid of Pinault by buying the former headquarters of CFAO for 1.3 billion."

"Originally, the fortune of the Bolloré family comes from an adventurous ancestor who brought back the secret of making "Bible paper" from China in the 1840s. Little by little, the Bollorés installed paper mills on the banks of the Odet River in southern Finistère. From René Guillaume Bolloré, who laid the foundation of the "cylinder paper factory" in Odet, Ergué-Gabéric, to Dr. Jean-René Bolloré, who conducted the first thin paper production tests, each generation of this Breton industrialist family will contribute to developing the famous OCB (Odet-Cascadec-Bolloré) cigarette paper made from rags, which will bring fortune to the dynasty."