Entity Dossier
entity

Consgold

Strategic Concepts & Mechanics

Risk DoctrineNo Cross-Pledging of Crown Jewels
Signature MoveDeals Hated, Strategy Loved
Signature MoveNever Run Out of Cheque-Writing Time
Relationship LeverageShare the Pie to Keep the Table
Strategic PatternEcho Bay Model Then Surpass It
Signature MoveKlosters Mountain as Strategic War Room
Identity & CultureRefugee Hunger as Permanent Engine
Cornerstone MoveWritten Memo Then Unanimous Sign-Off
Identity & CultureReturn to Canada Only With Success
Cornerstone MoveBuy Producing Assets at Cycle Bottom, Never Explore
Signature MoveTrust Mining Operators Then Stay Away
Operating PrincipleFocus as Compensation for Ordinary Talent
Cornerstone MoveBorrow Against the Asset to Buy the Asset
Decision FrameworkGeopolitical Disruption as Buy Signal
Strategic PatternScarcity Premium as Entry Signal
Signature MoveControl Without Majority Ownership

Primary Evidence

"The first action was the open-market purchase by Barrick of 4.9 percent of Consgold. Rudolf Agnew, the CEO of Consgold, perceived the potential of a Munk takeover bid, and was threatened because he thought that was what it was. Agnew made immediate contact with Munk. The two men met on January 13, and discussed the promising possibilities of Consgold’s two mines in North America—Mesquite and Chimney. At that time, the Oppenheimer family of South Africa were the largest single shareholders of Consgold, with about 30 percent of its stock. Under British law Munk couldn’t talk to or deal with the Oppenheimers. It would disqualify Barrick from bidding as a “concert party bid."

Source:The Golden Phoenix : A Biography of Peter Munk

"That, to me, was a very great promise. In the middle of this Consgold turmoil, which lasted almost a year, we made several million pounds on the transaction because, as we kept buying, the attendant publicity suddenly focused on Consgold as a takeover target. In fact, the Oppenheimers themselves then subsequently made a bid for more Consgold stock. The move on Consgold promised to give Munk much-needed mines, which “I would get later on by buying Goldstrike, but at that time I needed the next step.” A week after Munk met with Agnew, Bill Birchall received word that Hill Samuel was interested in buying all or any part of Barrick’s 5-percent shareholdings in Consgold. That useful information was of great comfort to Peter Munk, whose Consgold play had driven the market value of Barrick’s 4.9-percent holding up by over $10 million and rising. That would mean a tidy profit on an investment made but a few months earlier."

Source:The Golden Phoenix : A Biography of Peter Munk

"226 GOLDEN PHOENIX blue-chip firms of the London Stock Exchange. Consgold had two gold mining properties in North America that Munk wanted to acquire, Mesquite in Nevada and Chimney in California, but he had to make his play against Consgold itself in order to give himself some leverage whereby he could wedge out of Consgold those two target mines. Before he could make his Consgold move, Munk had to obtain the support of his board. He wrote a five-page memorandum which he distributed to them. That was followed by meetings and telephone board meetings. In the end he convinced his people and his directors, and the run at Consgold began."

Source:The Golden Phoenix : A Biography of Peter Munk

"It was time for Peter Munk to write one of his memos to colleagues. Munk wrote similar memoranda earlier for Consgold and later for the Trizec and Lac opportunities. It is his pattern of operation when he has made up his mind on any major acquisition or other strategic initiatives, but still needs to persuade and convince “his people.” On important issues it is required discipline to put the fundamental reasoning plus all the risks, versus rewards, into a written form. It helps people to think about the proposal, and it can be used years after the deal to review the thinking and check the assumptions."

Source:The Golden Phoenix : A Biography of Peter Munk

"The plan had been to have Barrick acquire a 4.9-percent share block in Consgold. Barrick could then move to acquire control, sell at a profit, or—the real objective—use the block as leverage to get Consgold to sell its two North American mines, Mesquite and Chimney, to Barrick. That objective was on the verge of being reached after discussions between Munk and Rudolf Agnew, Consgold’s chairman. But the price of Consgold shares moved beyond making financial sense, driven so high by the inappropriate Capel intervention that Barrick could no longer compete. Peter Munk does not tolerate being deceived by anyone—let alone professionals whom he has retained to advise and act for him, and who betray his trust. The James Capel Consgold activities were completely unacceptable. It was time to sue."

Source:The Golden Phoenix : A Biography of Peter Munk

"a earlier for Consgold and later for the Trizec and Lac opportunities. It is his pattern of operation when he has made up his mind on any major acquisition or other strategic initiatives, but still needs to persuade and convince “his peo- ple.” On important issues it is required discipline to put the funda- mental reasoning plus all the risks, versus rewards, into a written form. It helps people to think about the proposal, and it can be used ye"

Source:The Golden Phoenix : A Biography of Peter Munk

Appears In Volumes