Entity Dossier
entity

Getty

Strategic Concepts & Mechanics

Signature MovePerot: Obscene Demands Until They Stop Saying No
Signature MoveBuffett: Insurance Float as a Super Margin Account
Signature MoveHuizenga: Close in the Stench Until They Say Yes
Cornerstone MoveSteal the Playbook, Then Outrun the Author
Risk DoctrineLuck Acknowledged Then Ruthlessly Exploited
Identity & CultureJoy in the Chase Not the Prize
Capital StrategyHold Your Equity Until It Compounds Past Nine Figures
Identity & CultureThick Skin Inherited or Forged by Fire
Cornerstone MoveConsolidate Fragmented Industries at Blitzkrieg Speed
Cornerstone MoveNobody Got Rich Watching from the Stands
Strategic PatternHigh-Growth Industry as the Only On-Ramp
Capital StrategyInsurance Float as Empire Foundation
Signature MoveKerkorian: Sell Before the Peak, Never Pick the Bone Clean
Relationship LeveragePolitical Access as Wealth Multiplier Not Wealth Creator
Cornerstone MoveKeep the Back Door Open on Every Bet
Operating PrincipleFrugality as Permanent Competitive Moat
Signature MoveWalton: Spy on Every Competitor Then Outwork Them All
Signature MoveRockefeller: Silent Desk, Then Swivel-Chair Knockout
Signature MoveProfessional Distance From Speculation
Operating PrincipleChildlike Openness in Complex Domains
Signature MovePracticed Ignorance in Complex Fields
Operating PrincipleResist the 'Expert' Trap
Cornerstone MoveAbsolute Price Discipline
Decision FrameworkLimits Over Timing for Investors
Cornerstone MoveHidden Value Asset Play
Signature MoveLiquidity as Strategic Shield
Identity & CultureOwner’s Mentality Over Manager’s Ego
Strategic PatternDiversification for Cycle Resilience
Cornerstone MoveBuy Low, Fix Fast, Exit Slow
Decision FrameworkActivist Investor When Needed
Signature MoveQuestion-Driven Discipline
Strategic PatternContrarian Patience in Asset Markets
Operating PrincipleSpeed Beats Overplanning
Risk DoctrineEthics-First Boardroom Interventions
Cornerstone MoveStructural Tax Advantage Engineering
Signature MoveManagement Autonomy, Command When Needed
Signature MoveConviction Without Compromise
Operating PrincipleFree Cash Flow as Decision Lens

Primary Evidence

"According to his later account, Getty considered the Nancy Taylor prospect promising, but knew that older and better-established operators would be able to outbid him. Accordingly, he persuaded a bank to send one of its executives to bid in his name, without revealing his identity. Some of the wildcatters assumed that the banker must be bidding for one of the major oil companies, which would be prepared to top all offers. Others owed money to the bank and were therefore unwilling to bid against its representative. Thanks to his ruse, Getty recounted, all of his potential competitors sat out the auction, allowing him to obtain the lease for the pittance of $500. That, at least, is how Getty told the story. Independent evidence suggests that the other wildcatters passed on Nancy Taylor simply be¬ cause it seemed a poor prospect. Perhaps Getty embellished the story over the years, but there is no question that he struck oil on the property. He then sold it to a refiner, reaping $11,850 as his 30 percent share of the profit.21"

Source:How to Be a Billionaire : Proven Strategies From the Titans of Wealth

"Getty took pride in getting the better of an English peer when he acquired Sutton Place, a lavish estate outside London. The property included 60 acres of parkland, as well as a Tudor mansion with 14 principal bedrooms and a hall reputed to be the largest in Great Britain. In 1959, British landowners were reeling under tax rates as high as 98 percent. Sutton Place’s owner, the Duke of Sutherland, was further strained by the expense of operating his grossly overstaffed farms. Capitalizing on the duke’s predicament, Getty picked up the property for £50,000 (ft 140,000 at then-prevailing exchange rates). The sum represented less than half the price paid by the duke 40 years earlier."

Source:How to Be a Billionaire : Proven Strategies From the Titans of Wealth

"Even in the context of huge transactions, Getty could be amazingly careful with his money. In one instance, a longtime friend offered $17.5 million in cash for New York’s Pierre Hotel, which Getty had bought for $2.35 million. Agreeing that the price was fair, Getty contacted his lawyer to draw up terms. Notwithstanding the large gain he stood to realize, Getty insisted that his friend pay for the cable. While dictating the terms to his attorney, Getty inserted a clause releasing himself from the sale if a higher offer materialized within 90 days. He then used his friend’s unsolicited bid to shop the hotel around for a better price. In the end, a superior bid emerged; there is no record that Getty reimbursed the original, disappointed bidder for the cost of the cable.18"

Source:How to Be a Billionaire : Proven Strategies From the Titans of Wealth

"In his youth, his penchant for reading Playboy magazine nourished him with Getty's ideas, who said there was a sure formula for achieving financial success: "Get up early, work hard, and drill for oil.""

Source:Carlos Slim: Retrato Inédito

"Getty used to say, "When you don't have money, you always think about it and when you do have it, you only think about it.""

Source:Carlos Slim: Retrato Inédito

"The meeting went on until 1:35 A.M., and Tisch, whose reputation for integrity and Wall Street savvy had brought him to Getty’s atten- tion, began to wonder about Getty’s focus. Getty had met Tisch just a few weeks earlier and had already begun to rely on his commonsense approach to the situation, but it quickly became clear that Tisch wasn’t there to further Getty’s agenda. As always, Tisch was there to do the right thing for all the shareholders. The board reconvened at 1:45 a.m. Tisch told Getty he should de- mand that Pennzoil increase its bid to $120 a share. Pennzoil had to offer enough money to eliminate any lingering doubts about whether the price was a fair one. If the board approved a low bid, directors could face litigation by angry shareholders. On the other hand, Tisch saw no point to Sid Petersen’s proposal that the Getty company should buy back its own shares. If we’re voting for a self-tender just because we’re upset at Pennzoil and Mr. Getty, that’s not a valid reason,” Tisch told the board. Ad- dressing Getty, he said, “You may have suits if you do this by threat, and you should discuss this with your attorneys.” The threat was that, once the standstill was over, Getty and Williams would vote out op- posing directors, but the board couldn’t take the legal risk of accept- ing a deal that Goldman Sachs hadn’t deemed fair. “If someone challenges this transaction,” Tisch told him, “we will say you forced us, Mr. Getty.” “I have done nothing unethical!” Getty said. This is not ethics. You have not given the board the opportunity to seek a fair price, Tisch said. “A small ten-dollar sweetener. Some- thing to satisfy this board.”"

Source:The King of Cash: The Inside Story of Laurence Tisch

Appears In Volumes