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Havas

Strategic Concepts & Mechanics

Strategic PatternEuropean Champion Against Anglo-Saxon Model
Signature MoveHelicopter Into the Office, Terror on Tuesday
Signature MoveDynasty Over Dividends
Signature MoveTen Baskets Never One Catastrophe
Cornerstone MoveControl Without Paying the Price
Cornerstone MoveFriendly Call Then Capital Siege
Risk DoctrineReasonable Adventures Doctrine
Operating PrinciplePoliteness as Refusal to Say No
Capital StrategyBreton Pulleys Capital Architecture
Relationship LeverageBernheim as Deal Godfather
Signature MoveHis Own Truth Subject to Change
Signature MoveRecurring Cash Funds the Crazy Bets
Strategic PatternContent Platform Not Channel Bouquet
Competitive AdvantageFamily Tree as Attack Map
Cornerstone MoveSell at the Cycle Peak, Strike in the Trough
Identity & CultureSolipsist Commander on the Bridge

Primary Evidence

"Here are two entrepreneurs who are also heirs; who have tremendously developed what they inherited, even though Férinel's real estate was in much better condition than Bolloré's papers; who each identified a sleeping beauty (Dior, within the Boussac empire, for Arnault, and Rivaud bank for Bolloré); who followed the advice of the same godfather in the Parisian establishment-Antoine Bernheim-to finance their rise to power; who ensured the construction of their empire through a very unusual blend of entrepreneurial aggression and ability to leverage new financial market instruments; who experienced both failures and windfalls (Gucci for Arnault and Bouygues for Bolloré); who moved into the new century without forgetting how to wield hostility (Hermès and Havas learned this to their detriment); who practiced financial engineering with incredible dexterity-Arnault increased his share of LVMH's capital from 38% to 46% in one day, crushing the Christian Dior holding, while Bolloré reached 27% in Vivendi, thanks in large part to the billions inherited from the opportune merger of the communication group with Havas; and who, finally, share the same dynastic ambition, a fierce determination to firmly establish this resolutely familial choice over time. In fact, it is the defense of family capitalism that is the cause of their joint presence in Lagardère's capital, and the potential source of a collision..."

Source:Bollore, l'Homme Qui Inquiete

"So let's summarize: since entering Vivendi in 2012, the Bolloré group has received 660 million euros in Vivendi shares for its TNT channels, 1.34 billion euros in dividends, the equivalent of 1.4 billion euros saved through capital reductions, 2.4 billion euros through the acquisition of 60% of Havas, and a final asset of 8 billion euros in UMG shares. In total: nearly 14 billion euros that have benefited Bolloré during this prodigious decade. Of course, to enable this succession of operations, it was necessary to take risks and invest: tens of millions of euros to initially finance the annual losses of the TNT channels, hundreds of millions of euros to establish an impregnable position in Havas, and billions to strengthen their position in Vivendi. The true cost of Bolloré's takeover of Vivendi, Vincent Bolloré keeps to himself, likely between 3 and 4 billion euros. On the other hand, he has already earned three or four times more... and he still holds his 27% stake in Vivendi, even if it has become smaller. Hats off to the artist!"

Source:Bollore, l'Homme Qui Inquiete

"Three financial operations-Pathé, Lazard, Vallourec-and seven years later, Alain de Pouzilhac, then CEO of Havas, experienced the surprise of a phone call, also initially giving the benefit of the doubt to the raider: "It was July 20, 2004. I was at the headquarters of Havas in Suresnes when Vincent Bolloré called me-he was, I believe, on his boat, on a cruise. He immediately addressed me informally. 'Alain,' he said to me, 'I think Havas is undervalued but on the path to recovery. I took advantage of it to buy, without exceeding 5%.' At first, I was pleasantly surprised that an investor of his reputation was interested in us-it was a sign of confidence, after a terrible year in 2003. Maybe a chance for Havas, which wanted a stable shareholder. So, initially, his approach seemed positive to me. To the point that, when studying our bid for the acquisition of the American company Grey, I deemed it necessary to inform him. He immediately replied, 'I don't want to know anything, so as not to be informed, and to continue buying shares on the stock market.' And that's what he did. Since then, I have met with Vincent Bolloré on four occasions, but it is impossible to learn more about his intentions. I still don't know if he is a raider, with 20% of Havas, intending to dismantle or sell the company, or an industrialist who wants to create a major media group. Is he trying to take control of the company without paying the price? Absolutely not! I don't make it a question of individuals-investing around 300 million euros in Havas is very respectful.""

Source:Bollore, l'Homme Qui Inquiete

"At one time, at Bolloré, it was called the helicopter method. For six months, a year if necessary, he occupies the former boss's office, settles in the midst of the teams, and watches everything, controls everything. After taking control of Havas, whose headquarters happened to be adjacent to the Bolloré Tower on the banks of the Seine, he had two walkways built, jokingly justifying this double investment: "That way, you'll never know where I'm coming from!" Today, the metaphor of the helicopter has also gone digital: "I dive into a subject like Google Earth.""

Source:Bollore, l'Homme Qui Inquiete

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