Kléber

"Suddenly, however, Kléber is going to wake up. The V 10 runs well. Very well, in fact. Bulgaria, East Germany, and Yugoslavia buy the license. Kléber’s aviation tires equip not only the Caravelle and Mirage but also the Concorde and Boeing 747 (as they will soon equip Airbus). The Paris Stock Exchange discovers the old Colombes company with eyes like Chimène. Financial analysts readily present it as a growth stock. The stock prices soar. The cash flow, indeed, progresses faster than the sales. Huvelin has embarked on an ambitious investment program in France (Toul) and in Saar (Saint-Ingbert) which is expected to bear fruit soon. In the French tire market, Kléber’s penetration rises to nineteen percent in the years 1969-1970. In Germany, it approaches ten percent."

"François Michelin sets foot in the firm in Colombes in June 1965 by purchasing the shareholding of the American group B.F. Goodrich, which had started to open a subsidiary in France as early as 1910. A somewhat convoluted financial operation, at the end of which it is noted that Michelin holds, through the Société des procédés industriels modernes and Bergougnan—two businesses it controls—over 25 percent of Kléber, the second-largest French tire company and the first in manufactured rubber."

"Today, Lucien Mâle and his team give themselves three years to accomplish the impossible mission: restoring the financial balance on sound bases. It should cost the Michelin group another six hundred million francs (a third of which is devoted to encouraging “voluntary departures”). Kléber will progressively integrate into the Michelin sphere. Through its products, which will be entirely renewed by drawing on Bibendum’s experience; through its management methods, which will quickly be brought in line with those of Clermont; and through its people, to the extent that Kléber’s decision centers will be closely connected with those of the parent company."

"After long hesitation about what action to take, François Michelin provided some support to the ailing company. Executives from the parent company were “injected” into Bergougnan. Technicians came to finalize the development of various products: steel-reinforced conveyor belts called “Bergacier,” offshore hoses also with steel reinforcement, etc. However, the installations as a whole were outdated, management was too precarious, and Michelin did not intend to indefinitely burden itself with this enterprise, which could offer nothing in return. And Bergougnan, to keep its factories running, had engaged, at the beginning of the sixties, in a price war that greatly troubled its competitor Kléber. The circumstances were therefore favorable for François Michelin and Paul Huvelin, then head of Kléber, to meet."

"Nevertheless, it is not with much joy that Michelin arrived at Kléber. The mainly French company had never achieved impressive results. Additionally, a virtually mortal sin for the purist Auvergnats, it had deeply engaged in various fields unrelated to tires. Jack of all trades, master of none! Kléber-Colombes did not limit itself to producing all categories of car tires, heavy trucks, agricultural vehicles, and aircraft. It also included a multitude of conveyor belts, hoses, belts, conveyors, shoe articles, automobile parts, and even, since 1964, a Guide for gastronomic tourists, a modest competitor to the red guide[50](private://read/01jkqdqdgs7t399cyecbezrhj0/#ftn_fn50)."

"Well, we’ll see. If François Michelin acquires these 25.2 percent of Kléber’s capital, he intends to, on the other hand, stay on the doorstep. He warned Paul Huvelin and his right-hand man on Avenue Kléber, Manuel Béraldi, that he would leave them completely free rein. No question of “nurturing” the business by providing any technical, industrial, or commercial support. Especially no osmosis between the teams (the Parisian air is not necessarily good for Auvergne lungs). The two firms must remain as foreign to each other as if they were evolving in two different galaxies. There will not even be a Michelin representative on the Kléber board of directors."

"On the other hand, the situation in passenger car tires is catastrophic, with installed capacities (eight million tires per year) being excessive compared to demand. The brand image, since the blows from UFC, has seriously deteriorated. Technicality, cost prices, and methods are lagging behind the competition. The size of the company no longer allows for amortization over sufficiently long series, which is necessary for research and development. And the all-out commercial policy was more focused on volume than on profit. Kléber’s commercial expenses, the people from Clermont note with horror, are twice those of Michelin!"

"On the other hand, in 1963, Kléber launched the “V 10,” a radial tire with a textile carcass, thanks to the work of the director of the Colombes factory, Roger Galland. This followed the path opened twelve years earlier by Pirelli. The “V 10” was an instant success. (Before leaving, Goodrich learned everything necessary from its former subsidiary to market the first American radial tire under its brand in 1967.) Kléber gained ground in France and in exports. A new factory was built in Troyes."