Moët

"On both sides, grievances accumulate. Racamier's explanation: "The people at Moët-Hennessy experienced the merger as an absorption of Louis Vuitton and not as what it really was, namely an association." Chevalier's version: "Racamier is a difficult man who wants to control everything down to the smallest detail; you can't run a business with him." The disillusionment is great for Chevalier, who thought he could put the Vuitton family in his pocket as he had previously done with Moët, Chandon, Hennessy, and others Mercier."

"When Henry Racamier introduced Bernard Arnault to the representatives of Moët and Hennessy on June 30th, he was obviously unaware of the negotiations between the president of Dior and Chevalier and Guinness. The families were also unaware. The president of Vuitton presented his takeover project which angered the families. They saw it as a betrayal from within, when they had feared an outside raider. They would never forgive him for this and asked Henry Racamier to leave the room. Frédéric Chandon de Briailles and Alain de Pracomtal then drew Bernard Arnault's attention to the dangers of a takeover: "Not only can another group attack us, but our best collaborators may leave us," they told him. Arnault acknowledged the argument. Alain de Pracomtal continued: "Would you see any inconvenience in associating with Guinness, with whom the group has committed itself?" Bernard Arnault was too happy to answer no. In exchange for this agreement that suited him, he asked for a right of first refusal on the shares of the Moët and Hennessy families, that is, on 13% of the capital. And he obtained it. The agreement will be signed at Lazard at the end of July. It does not have the unanimity of the approximately 200 members of the families. About fifteen young "reformers", especially among the Hennessys, think they are being forced. In any case, from now on, they are all linked: if they want to sell their shares, they are required to offer them first to Bernard Arnault. His strategy is starting to pay off. Bernard Arnault has managed to rally everyone to his side in... less than a week. First Racamier, who still relies on him to oust Chevalier. Then Chevalier, who is convinced he has found the necessary support in him to neutralize Racamier. Just like the families, who are now condemned to play with him. Finally Guinness, who has obtained a seat at LVMH thanks to him. A clever move. Everyone thinks they owe him something. No one yet suspects the young man's true intentions. "They will not be able to compromise my plans," he must speculate. He knows he has only strengths in his hand."

"A few rooms on Rue de la Trémoille in Paris served as an office until a small hotel belonging to the Mercier family became available at 30 Avenue Hoche. Alain Chevalier, supported by the families, then decided to build a real headquarters in the image of the new group. A large modern building bringing together Hennessy on the first floor, Moët on the second, Parfums Dior on the fourth and fifth, financial services on the sixth, the General Directorate on the seventh, and on the eighth, two dining rooms with lacquer and orchid decor overlooking the rooftops of Paris, reflecting the new manager's fascination with Japan."

"It is on the sixth floor of 70 Champs-Élysées that Racamier organizes his shadowy meetings. When he agrees to receive or speak to a few privileged individuals, he brings them to the luxurious Vuitton decor of his hideout. It reflects perfectly the Vuitton philosophy: a few trunks, travel photos, fawn tones, a leather smell, and of course, a glass of Veuve Clicquot for the guests and a glass of Tio Pépé for the host. In this outdated setting, he tells the story of Louis Vuitton and explains his concern to make it a distinct brand: "The alchemy was not easy to achieve. We often tend to go for the easiest option. If we had not held the bar firmly, Louis Vuitton would have become a larger Lancel." He justifies himself: "The merger was intended to balance the risks. The strategy had already begun with the acquisition of Veuve Clicquot. But the graft with Moët did not take.""

"Mrs. Piniot recalls that Moët's management had committed to placing the warrants with foreign investors. However, she notes that more than two-thirds of the issued warrants were placed with French institutional investors who agreed to hold them for a certain period of time. These included the Caisse des dépôts et consignations, the Caisse nationale du Crédit Agricole, Crédit Lyonnais, BNP, and UAP. A memorandum of understanding was even considered to formalize this commitment. It was only signed by UAP. Therefore, Mrs. Piniot concludes that there was a "misuse of procedure harmful to minority shareholders." Even more serious, she emphasizes that Bernard Arnault was perfectly aware of this irregularity when he entered the capital of LVMH. When the head of Dior abandoned his takeover bid and opted for a less aggressive solution, Lazard bank assigned one of its partners, David Dautresme, to recover the maximum number of warrants and "negotiate the conditions of their transfer." The operations were carried out through a Luxembourg intermediary, Belmavobel International Securities. Thanks to these negotiations, Arnault obtained nearly 94% of the issued warrants, which ensured him nearly 12% of LVMH's capital."

"No one speaks anymore. Caution and fear keep the group's employees entrenched in their original company. Those from Moët and Chandon in Épernay, those from Hennessy in Cognac, and those from Parfums Dior in Orléans."