Niccolò Machiavelli

"It ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them.—Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince"

"It ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them. —Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince"

"The difficulties that are involved in holding a state newly acquired having been considered, one might marvel at how it happened that Alexander the Great became lord of Asia in a few years, and just after he had seized it, died—from which it appeared reasonable that all that state would rebel—nonetheless the successors of Alexander maintained it and had no other difficulty in holding it than that which arose among themselves out of their own ambition.1 I reply that principalities of which memory remains have been governed in two diverse modes: either by one prince, and all the others servants who as ministers help govern the kingdom by his favor and appointment; or by a prince and by barons who hold that rank not by favor of the lord but by antiquity of bloodline. Such barons have their own states and subjects who recognize them as lords and hold them in natural affection. States that are governed by one prince and his servants hold their prince in greater authority because in all his province there is no one recognized as superior but himself; and if they obey someone else, they do so as a minister and official, and do not bear him any particular love."

"The prince can gain the people to himself in many modes, for which one cannot give certain rules because the modes vary according to circumstances,1 and so they will be left out. I will conclude only that for a prince it is necessary to have the people friendly; otherwise he has no remedy in adversity."

"a prince should have no other object, nor any other thought, nor take anything else as his art but that of war and its orders and discipline; for that is the only art which is of concern to one who commands."

"From this one can infer another notable thing: that princes should have anything blameable administered by others, favors10 by themselves. Again I conclude that a prince should esteem the great, but not make himself hated by the people."

"A certain prince of present times, whom it is not well to name,6 never preaches anything but peace and faith, and is very hostile to both. If he had observed both, he would have had either his reputation or his state taken from him many times."

"Alexander VI never did anything, nor ever thought of anything, but how to deceive men, and he always found a subject to whom he could do it. And there never was a man with greater efficacy in asserting a thing, and in affirming it with greater oaths, who observed it less; nonetheless, his…"