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Northwest Industries

Strategic Concepts & Mechanics

Strategic PatternProcess of Bites, Not Grand Plans
Decision FrameworkCash Flow Over Earnings as Debt Survival Test
Relationship LeverageHighly Confident as Substitute for Actual Capital
Capital StrategyInterest Deductibility as Leveraged Assault Fuel
Competitive AdvantageNOL as Bidding War Nuclear Option
Signature MoveSpeed-of-Sale as Debt Survival Doctrine
Signature MoveLawyer as Deal Principal, Not Hired Gun
Signature MoveParis Apartment Discipline
Signature MoveAll Debt Disguised as Equity
Cornerstone MoveBuy the Whole, Sell Everything But the Crown Jewel
Cornerstone MoveBlind Pool Before the Target Exists
Cornerstone MoveBribe the Gatekeeper, Storm the Castle
Cornerstone MoveBankruptcy's Tax Corpse as Acquisition Weapon
Competitive AdvantageTax Arbitrage as Structural Weapon
Operating PrincipleProfessional Manager Decay Across Generations
Risk DoctrineNever Cut Back a Committed Deal
Signature MoveMilken: Four-Thirty AM Cathedral-Builder With No Office
Capital StrategyVenture Capital Masquerading as Debt
Signature MovePeltz: Spittle-on-the-Check Persistence from Near-Broke
Signature MovePerelman: Borrowed $1.9M to a Boeing 727 in Seven Years
Cornerstone MoveManufactured Credibility from Thin Air
Decision FrameworkContra-Thinking as Default Mental Operating System
Identity & CultureForced Savings as Loyalty Handcuffs
Cornerstone MoveCash Flow Over Earnings as the Only Truth
Cornerstone MoveBuy the Core, Sell the Pieces, Erase the Debt
Signature MoveKingsley: Mount Everest Desk, Twenty-Year Sounding Board
Signature MoveIcahn: Wrestling-a-Ghost Negotiation Until the Last Penny
Cornerstone MoveOwner's Equity as the Non-Negotiable Discipline
Cornerstone MoveHidden Value Asset Play
Signature MoveLiquidity as Strategic Shield
Identity & CultureOwner’s Mentality Over Manager’s Ego
Strategic PatternDiversification for Cycle Resilience
Cornerstone MoveBuy Low, Fix Fast, Exit Slow
Decision FrameworkActivist Investor When Needed
Signature MoveQuestion-Driven Discipline
Strategic PatternContrarian Patience in Asset Markets
Operating PrincipleSpeed Beats Overplanning
Risk DoctrineEthics-First Boardroom Interventions
Cornerstone MoveStructural Tax Advantage Engineering
Signature MoveManagement Autonomy, Command When Needed
Signature MoveConviction Without Compromise
Operating PrincipleFree Cash Flow as Decision Lens

Primary Evidence

"Drexel clients—in addition to Triangle Industries—would make bids for companies, all backed by Milken’s junk bonds. Mesa Petroleum, with a net worth of $ 500 million, would go for Unocal. Lorimar, with a net worth of $ 105 million, would offer $ 1 billion for Multimedia. Sir James Goldsmith would make a bid for Crown Zellerbach Corporation for $ 1.1 billion. Golden Nugget, with a net worth of $ 230 million, would go for Hilton Hotels for about $ 1.8 billion. And Farley Industries, with earnings of $ 6 million, would go for Northwest Industries, for about $ 1.4 billion. Other bids would take longer to germinate—but they would turn out to be the most fruitful of all."

Source:The Predators' Ball

"Drexel clients—in addition to Triangle Industries—would make bids for companies, all backed by Milken’s junk bonds. Mesa Petroleum, with a net worth of $500 million, would go for Unocal. Lorimar, with a net worth of $105 million, would offer $1 billion for Multimedia. Sir James Goldsmith would make a bid for Crown Zellerbach Corporation for $1.1 billion. Golden Nugget, with a net worth of $230 million, would go for Hilton Hotels for about $1.8 billion. And Farley Industries, with earnings of $6 million, would go for Northwest Industries, for about $1.4 billion. Other bids would take longer to germinate—but they would turn out to be the most fruitful of all."

Source:Predator's Ball

"Tisch’s winning investments had more to do with day-to-day man- agement of finances and operations than with economic foresight. In 1979, Tisch was asked what he would buy to hold for 20 years. Four' teen years later, many of his picks would look like dogs. For example, he liked savings-and-loan associations, which turned out to be one of the most prominent national economic disasters of the early 1990s, because of high-risk lending and investing. Federated Department Stores, another Tisch pick, would get gobbled up by a reckless Campeau Corp. in the late 1980s, only to be plunged into bankruptcy by too much debt. He liked Tosco, wrongly betting that its oil shale business would boom because of problems with the traditional sources of oil. Savin Business Machines would end up in bankruptcy court in 1992, Studebaker-Worthington Inc. would be bought out later that year by McGraw-Edison Co., and Northwest Industries was the sub- ject of a crippling, debt-laden buyout in the mid-1980s. But Tisch wasn’t one to make bets himself on the basis of a 20-year forecast. “We’re pragmatic,” he said. “Our philosophy could change from one day to the next.”"

Source:The King of Cash: The Inside Story of Laurence Tisch

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