Entity Dossier
entity

Skandia Investment

Strategic Concepts & Mechanics

Signature MoveSavén: Educate the Market Before You Can Sell To It
Operating PrincipleClear-Cut Forestry vs Regrowth Capitalism
Signature MoveJonsson: Wallenberg Network as Entry Ticket
Signature MoveMix: Shotgun Weddings Then Velvet-Rope Fundraising
Strategic PatternDeregulation as Deal-Flow Gold Rush
Capital StrategySecondaries: Passing Companies Between PE Funds
Cornerstone MoveDouble Profitability or Don't Enter
Cornerstone MoveHunt Corporate Orphans After Deregulation
Competitive AdvantageCanadian Pension Model: Kill the Middleman
Identity & CultureSwedish Hero Immunity for Visible Founders
Signature MoveKarlsson: Ratos as the Anti-Fund — Hold Seventeen Years If Needed
Risk DoctrineShort-Termism Trap: Five-Year Horizon vs Ten-Year Payoff
Signature MoveDahlström: Low Leverage, Family Businesses, Patient Capital
Cornerstone MoveDebt as the Engine, Company Pays Its Own Ransom
Signature MoveAhlström: Copenhagen Office to Dodge Swedish Capital Controls
Cornerstone MoveFee Airbag: Get Paid Win or Lose

Primary Evidence

"They needed an advisor but were in no hurry. It took Nordgren over a year to decide which suitor to choose. In the end, it was Christer Dahlström and Skandia Investment who, through newly issued shares, were able to buy 15 percent of the company for 10 million kronor. At that time, Skandia Investment made all purchases with their own money, no borrowed funds. Therefore, they only entered as minority owners, so that the money would suffice for several different businesses. Nefab, which had sales of 120 million when Skandia bought in, then experienced rapid growth—they started production in China, South America, Malaysia. In 1996, the company was listed on the stock exchange, with sales by then of 560 million. The family remained as major owners. Thus, they shared in the increased value of the company as it grew, while maintaining control. In 2007, Nordgren, together with another private equity firm, Nordic Capital, bought the company off the stock exchange again. The family felt that Nefab was undervalued, and Nordic, as one of Sweden’s largest private equity firms, had the resources to take the company to the next growth phase. By then, the value had risen to 2.7 billion. Nordgren sold some shares again, but kept 40 percent of the company. Nordic had to settle for buying 60 percent; they would have preferred a larger majority, but had to give in. Ingmarie and Jockum Nordgren-Pihl, who now live in Luxembourg, were not willing to negotiate."

Source:The Finance Princes - The Story of the Swedish Venture Capitalists

"But Peter “Pirre” Wallenberg, who sat on Skandia’s board, did not think that at the board level, in one of Sweden’s larger companies, they should discuss what he considered individual small deals. The solution was to start the subsidiary Skandia Investment, with its own management and board, and place the unlisted holdings there."

Source:The Finance Princes - The Story of the Swedish Venture Capitalists

"The deal was to be completed no later than Thursday, April 15. On Wednesday, the Finnish lawyers called and said: “You can’t use mezzanine loans; there is no legal wording for them in Finland.” Mezzanine loans, which constituted 15 percent of the purchase price, have lower priority in bankruptcies than regular bank loans and therefore have higher interest rates. But they did not exist in Finland and were therefore not approved as part of the financing. — Suddenly, 50 million were missing, so we started calling all the investors and asked if they could consider putting in a bit more, but we only managed to raise 40 million. Finally, I called Christer Dahlström at Skandia Investment, who had invested with us before, and asked if he could take the last 10 million. He said no, and I was about to hang up, but before I could do so, he said in the next breath: “I’ll take 20.”"

Source:The Finance Princes - The Story of the Swedish Venture Capitalists

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