Weinroth

"Weinroth was drawn to Drexel because he saw a “happy constellation” in place. The medium-sized companies Drexel was targeting were indeed an underserved market, the high-yield bond was its perfect product, and Milken was already dominant in trading those bonds. Moreover, Weinroth—avuncular, rotund, hardly an investment banker in the white-shoe mold—felt temperamentally suited to these clients and the role he would play. “With medium-sized companies, you can really get to know the managements, and you can really help them. I figured I could make a difference. I wasn’t dealing with an Exxon.”"

"Weinroth lapsed into the familiar refrain (articulated by Milken, Icahn and others of their persuasion) about the decline of corporate America in the hands of its managers, and its rescue by the new breed of manager-owners. “Old companies were started by true entrepreneurs, who had children some of whom were affected by the ills of the rich,” he continued. “They brought in professional managers, who ran the companies in a conservative fashion . . . but those professional managers didn’t have an ownership stake. Their risk-reward ratio was skewed to being a conservator, not an initiator. Then the second-generation [managers] grew to the top. And even if they were high quality as managers, they were certainly not entrepreneurial. And then that group promoted people who couldn’t threaten them, and they in turn hired people inferior to them, who lived for their perks and compensation and ran their companies conservatively because they had no upside interest. And by the time you go through several generations of these managers, you have a company run by dull-normals!"

"Weinroth lapsed into the familiar refrain (articulated by Milken, Icahn and others of their persuasion) about the decline of corporate America in the hands of its managers, and its rescue by the new breed of manager-owners. “Old companies were started by true entrepreneurs, who had children some of whom were affected by the ills of the rich,” he continued. “They brought in professional managers, who ran the companies in a conservative fashion . . . but those professional managers didn’t have an ownership stake. Their risk-reward ratio was skewed to being a conservator, not an initiator. Then the second-generation [managers] grew to the top. And even if they were high quality as managers, they were certainly not entrepreneurial. And then that group promoted people who couldn’t threaten them, and they in turn hired people inferior to them, who lived for their perks and compensation and ran their companies conservatively because they had no upside interest. And by the time you go through several generations of these managers, you have a company run by dull-normals!"

"Weinroth was drawn to Drexel because he saw a “happy constellation” in place. The medium-sized companies Drexel was targeting were indeed an underserved market, the high-yield bond was its perfect product, and Milken was already dominant in trading those bonds. Moreover, Weinroth—avuncular, rotund, hardly an investment banker in the white-shoe mold—felt temperamentally suited to these clients and the role he would play. “With medium-sized companies, you can really get to know the managements, and you can really help them. I figured I could make a difference. I wasn’t dealing with an Exxon.”"