Chrysler

"Another key to Kerkorian’s success in trading aircraft was a tech¬ nique he called “keeping the back door open.”11 If he could not resell a new plane at a profit, he might be able to use it in his charter fleet. Fail¬ ing that, he would sell it back to the manufacturer at a previously agreed-upon price. This strategy of maintaining several different op¬ tions was evident in Kerkorian’s later dealings such as the Chrysler affair. It was reminiscent, too, of Laurence Tisch’s hedged approach of leasing the Laurel-in-the-Pines hotel before committing himself to buying it."

""These kids have gotten the cockeyed idea into their heads that there's something wrong with profits, when profits and other incentives are the engine. And they seem to think that there's something sinister about bigness—just bigness in it- self. Have they stopped to think that if you didn't have a General Motors or Ford or Chrysler we'd still be driving horse carriages over dirt roads? You can't do the big jobs without big companies. The bigger the company, the bigger the jobs it can do and must do, it's as simple as that. And another fallacy. Youngsters seem to think that opportunity is dead, that you have to become a company man in a giant corpora- tion. Nuts. If a fellow wants to be his own boss, opportunities are busting out all over the place like they never have before.""