Product-Owner as Mini-CEO Guillotine

"The product-owner became a product’s chief executive officer."

"Now, the organization we put together included development and support. They belonged together. The idea was, Give one person the accountability, give one person the authority—and make it all the same person. If he or she does well, tell him and take care of him. If he screws up, throw him out the door."

"managing people. The product-owner has to make sure he’s got the appropriate people, that he’s got a team, and that the various responsibilities get met.”’ It was a form of neo-Darwin- ism. Russ: “But not everyone’s cut out for it. It’s a new concept that we created here, and it really takes a well- rounded, versatile individual. It’s got to be someone who's technical. He’s got to understand the vision, where the prod- uct is, where it’s going. Good with people. And support ori- ented. And development oriented. So we look from within and say, ‘OK, who deserves this shot, who might be good?’ And as talented as he or she may be, sometimes we find that this isn’t a product-owner, so they might be best going back to what they were doing before, being a development leader for instance. He might be very good at that, but not a very good product-owner.”’ Natural selection. As the framework evolved, product-ownership took on a tensile strength within CA. Product-owners became responsible to superproduct-owners, who themselves became responsible to what can only be called mega—product-owners—the ultimate product-owner being Charles. Little wonder that the product- owners who succeeded took on the characteristics of Charles himself: extremely technical, marketing-sensitive managers who could motivate and lead people and who kept their eyes on the details while shaping the vision. With this sort of manager, a skein of “ownership” cut through the entire structure of devel- opment, marketing, and support at CA, functioning not as a"

"CA had found a way to put together the best combination of human talent at the level that counted most: the product level. This was simply a ramification of Charles’ original logic. To make money, you need products; to get products, you need people—but you had to get the right people. They actually had to love working in such an exposed situation—virtually a guillo- tine—because if the blade doesn’t fall, the same individual moves to a shady spot under an even larger blade, where he or"