Entity Dossier
entity

Atlas

Strategic Concepts & Mechanics

Identity & CultureFree Market Conviction from Regulation Experience
Strategic PatternDiscontinuity Hunting as Core Strategy
Competitive AdvantageStructural Value Recognition Over Market Timing
Cornerstone MovePrivatization Partnership Arbitrage
Capital StrategyIntellectual Freedom Through Financial Independence
Signature MoveWalk Away as Negotiation Weapon
Signature MoveCash Preservation as Freedom Doctrine
Cornerstone MoveZero-Money Leveraged Takeovers
Signature MoveHands-Off Management Through Trusted Operators
Relationship LeverageRelationship Leverage in Government Asset Sales
Operating PrincipleManagement Avoidance as Operational Principle
Signature MoveSingle A4 Sheet Analysis
Risk DoctrineRisk Elimination Over Risk Taking
Decision FrameworkPsychology Over Numbers in Deals
Signature MovePartner Selection Over Capital

Primary Evidence

"In the summer of 1979/80, however, soon after their initial success with Tappenden, Charles Bidwill persuaded Gibbs to join him in buying some Atlas shares. Gibbs blames Bidwill’s charm for getting him entangled with the business. The strategy, from Bidwill’s point of view, was not that they were going to make money from fridges, stoves and chickens, but that since it was so unloved Atlas might be a relatively cheap and easy way to acquire a public company, which they could use as a vehicle to acquire other companies. Young and confident, Bidwill was fairly dismissive of the business leadership of the ‘RSA generation’ that still held on to power round New Zealand boardroom tables at the end of the 1970s:"

Source:Serious Fun

"There was an educational benefit to Gibbs, however. Atlas’ relationship with Japanese suppliers taught him a lot about a very different business culture. Having been horrified a decade earlier by Japanese companies going against their contracts with the Australians for iron ore, he rapidly came to appreciate the flexibility when Atlas needed relief from its obligations. Atlas simply wouldn’t have survived unless the Japanese had agreed to orders being cancelled, prices on goods already arrived being adjusted, and credit arrangements being extended. ‘If you’re in the poo,’ Gibbs says, ‘Japanese firms will try to help their partners out.’ They took a much longer view than most Western companies, and made sure their brand was protected by not allowing their distributor to go broke."

Source:Serious Fun

"The nature of Gibbs’ involvement in Forestry Corp was similar to that of his role at Atlas, Freightways and Bendon. His style was markedly different to John Fernyhough’s, for example, who as chairman of Electricorp spent most of his working week in Wellington and operated as an executive chairman. Gibbs gave Kirkland clear direction and then limited his role to challenging, provoking and guiding — and then stepping back to allow the chief executive to do his job. After an initial burst in February and March 1986, he spent no more than two or three days a month on the task. Gibbs says he’s always been ‘very cunning at avoiding the time-consuming business of managing people or of getting sucked into detail’. As a result he was able to cover an extraordinary amount of ground in business and public service, while still retaining enough freedom to travel for as much as three months a year and to think of new schemes. When most of Gibbs’ counterparts could tell him what meeting they’d be attending in a year’s time, Gibbs worked hard to avoid commitments that denied him spontaneity. Wherever he was, in New York or Harare, Gibbs kept on top of his half-dozen work streams with a steady flow of handwritten fax messages, channelled through Jacquie Turner at the West Plaza office."

Source:Serious Fun

"During the critical months of the Freightways privatisation, Gibbs had other deals and projects running in parallel. His old ally Tom Clark had steadily increased Ceramco’s shareholding in Atlas until it reached 40 per cent by late 1984. Gibbs admits that blending an electronics and whiteware business with Ceramco’s bricks, crockery and engineering created a ‘totally inappropriate mix’ of companies, but ‘Tom was always wanting to buy something’ and Ceramco’s friendly stake shored up Gibbs’ and Bidwill’s control of Atlas. In July 1985 they went a step further and announced plans for a full merger of Ceramco and Atlas; Atlas shareholders were offered one Ceramco share plus 10 cents, valuing Atlas shares at $3.67, a 16 per cent premium on the market price.[24](private://read/01jrsfvkjy84rkprtbz9amfvj8/#rw-num-note-477308-556173400-24) Gibbs and Bidwill were praised for having spearheaded a classic recovery for Atlas’ shareholders from 25 cents in 1980.[25](private://read/01jrsfvkjy84rkprtbz9amfvj8/#rw-num-note-477308-556173400-25) When the merger was declared unconditional on 3 September the net result was that Gibbs and Bidwill became Ceramco’s largest shareholders, with 26 per cent between them.[26](private://read/01jrsfvkjy84rkprtbz9amfvj8/#rw-num-note-477308-556173400-26) Gibbs replaced John Fair as chairman of Ceramco; Bidwill took over as managing director. Interviewed soon after, Clark said of Gibbs: *He’s lean and tough but at the same time he’s got a cool, evaluating, analytical streak. He’s imaginative, a great people motivator; he’s dead honest, straight up and down — all the things I admire. We’ve had plenty of punch-ups. I don’t think the friendship would be any good without them. I used to win and now he wins. I’m prepared to give up the reins and let him go.*[27](private://read/01jrsfvkjy84rkprtbz9amfvj8/#rw-num-note-477308-556173400-27)"

Source:Serious Fun

"It was massively difficult. All the restructuring was destroying the basics of New Zealand’s historically protected economy. Most businesses I owned were wiped out: Ceramco and Atlas ultimately disappeared. It’s a wonder we didn’t go broke. But I’d dealt with import licensing for years; I knew how sick it was. No bloody way was I going to keep my sad business alive at the expense of getting New Zealand sorted out. We didn’t lose money because we didn’t fight deregulation; we saw where it was going and worked our arses off to liquidate those businesses that were losing their whole economic rationale before they were valueless. Those that waited, like Winstones, were the ones that really struggled."

Source:Serious Fun

"After the initial burst of activity from mid-1980 to early 1981, Atlas barely occupied three or four days a month of Gibbs’ time. Bidwill was the executive director while, even before his formal appointment as chairman, Gibbs’ style was to latch on to the topic periodically, testing and challenging Bidwill’s ideas, then letting him get on with it, while he kept his mind free for other opportunities."

Source:Serious Fun

Appears In Volumes