Bank of France

"On February 7, 1935, the restructuring of the Société Anonyme des Automobiles André Citroën is decided by the liquidation committee. The Bank of France, solicited by the government, provides its assistance. There are two urgencies: filling the three hundred million francs gap in cash flow and negotiating the spreading of the two hundred fifteen million francs of debt. The main creditors — there are two thousand four hundred and fifty in total — gather under the banner of Bibendum, whose austerity and sense of large sums inspire confidence. The banks, delighted to no longer deal with the “great charmer,” reopen the floodgates. One hundred twenty-five million francs flow in. In June, a “squeeze-out” on the capital successively allows it to be reduced to seventy-five million francs and then increased to two hundred ten million."

"Without a word, the “engineer-builder” who had introduced modern automobile industry to Europe, allowing France to maintain its technical leadership in this cutting-edge field, gathers his personal belongings and leaves. “A very great industrialist but a debatable administrator,” said a former governor of the Bank of France about him."

"Jacques Letertre. He succeeded because he went fast. In less than four years, he became the president of Duménil-Leblé, a former small brokerage house that became a bank, and he is at the head of a colossal fortune. His recipe: take full advantage of the pitfalls of regulation whenever possible. Initially, he fully benefited from "interest rate spreads" by detecting the very lucrative niche of arbitrage between the money market and the bond market: Duménil issued 2 to 10-year bills on the money market, then carrying an interest rate of around 9.5% at 5 years. He simultaneously subscribed with the capital raised to bonds of the same duration yielding up to 11%. It was enough to pocket the difference. It took his success for the Bank of France to regulate activities on "interest rate spreads" and limit the jackpot."

"Boussac had told his cousin André that he was informed of the devaluation a few days before the official announcement and took the opportunity to place continuous purchase orders on foreign exchanges, both in securities and raw materials, for two days. In fact, since the trip that Emmanuel Monick, governor of the Bank of France, took to the United States at Léon Blum’s request to gauge President Roosevelt’s reactions, and especially after the enthusiastic telegram, quickly leaked, that he sent to the President of the Council after their meeting, the devaluation had become an open secret. Many speculators were able to take advantage of the information."