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Bjørn Rune Gjelsten

Strategic Concepts & Mechanics

Risk DoctrineRisk-Taker’s Necessary Callousness
Relationship LeverageRelational Business as Expansion Engine
Cornerstone MoveBuy the Debt, Control the Board
Signature MoveOperational Squeeze for Max Resale
Signature MoveHands-On Cash Control
Signature MoveOpportunistic Asset Swapping
Operating PrincipleDeal Before Respect
Risk DoctrineSecrecy as Power Shield
Identity & CultureAct Like You Belong Already
Identity & CultureOutwork and Outwait
Capital StrategyCash Up Before the Crash
Signature MoveMajority Means Mandate
Cornerstone MoveTempt Key People, Extract Companies
Cornerstone MoveCross-Table Value Pump

Primary Evidence

"Normally, even a composition would have meant the end of the line, as it is rare for a brand to survive such a cold shower without receiving negative feedback from consumers. However, that did not happen for the Molde company. The demand for Frank Shorter apparel just continued to rise, and orders poured in. Bjørn Rune Gjelsten felt the optimism returning. It was like in the ski tracks – when he felt it was going well, the energy came by itself. It was a hectic spring. The owners signed contracts with local agents in the United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, Denmark, and the Netherlands. In Norway, they entered the Intersport chain with both summer and winter clothing. Just a few days after the creditors forgave the debt, GN was ahead of its budget. Now everything indicated that they would manage sales of six million kroner in 1984, they concluded at the end of April. There was much better order within the ranks internally as well. The experienced bankruptcy attorney and Reksten-hunter Jens Kristian Thune took over as chairman of the board, and he taught the newly graduated sprouts a trick, namely to have export orders guaranteed through the Guarantee Institute for Export Credits (GIEK). They were not going to take any more hits."

Source:Kjell Inge Røkke (translated)

"In a meeting with the creditors at the end of April, all but one agreed to let mercy prevail over justice. The end result was that the creditors forgave 1.9 million in debt, or three-quarters of the money they were owed. They really had no choice. The alternative would have been bankruptcy, and that would not have yielded much – the young owners did not even have a nail in the wall. "It was a tough round, mentally as well, but we settled up and 90 percent of the suppliers continued with us. I had to mortgage my house and car," Bjørn Rune Gjelsten recounts."

Source:Kjell Inge Røkke (translated)

"Austad is an inspirer and a brand builder by the grace of God. Where others got hung up on zippers and buttons on the sports jackets, Austad noticed the brand on the chest. What were the customers really asking for when they bought Nike shoes for 1,300 kroner? Was it the quality of the shoe, or was it the status of owning such an expensive shoe, combined with the buyer believing the shoe was extremely good? Austad understood how the customers thought, and where sports stores nagged about screws, nuts, and service, the boss thought sales, sales, sales. Austad himself emphasizes that he should not take all the credit. Smart enough, he always stressed how important and useful it was to have Kjell Inge Røkke and Bjørn Rune Gjelsten on the board. "Most other boards spend 90 percent of the time talking about the past, and only 10 percent about the future. In the Gresvig board, it was the opposite. There we mostly looked forward," says Austad. Before the trio took over, G-Sport was a series of country stores with huge parts warehouses and outdated tracksuits. Many of the stores struggled heavily, with little support from the chain. Austad backed them into a corner: Either they joined, or they were out immediately."

Source:Kjell Inge Røkke (translated)

"During some quick chess moves, Røkke, Gjelsten, and Storetvedt moved properties between their companies and hyped up the values. Once again, Kjell Inge Røkke was on all sides of the table when the deals were made. It started with ANS Gresvig Bygg, the headquarters of the sports wholesaler in Askim. The building was sold to Gjelsten & Røkke Eiendom and leased back again. Now, you might not think that had a significant effect, but then you do not work at the Oslo Stock Exchange. With this maneuver, Røkke managed to reduce the debt in Gresvig – while simultaneously increasing the income in his real estate company. And just like that, both rose in value, even though Røkke was really just dealing with himself. This is how a kingdom was united under Jan Petter Storetvedt. When one of Røkke's companies had a large office or a factory building, it was sold – and leased back. Thus, everything was transferred to the newly started company Industribygg. Gradually, this company had purchased industrial buildings for close to 275 million kroner from the other Røkke companies, including four factory buildings belonging to the major fish exporter Skaarfish, which Røkke bought for a song when the company was down and out. Thus, the companies were stripped of properties. But not to slaughter them and parcel them out into delicacies according to Bjørn Rune Gjelsten: "The reason why we established Industribygg was that too much management time was spent on the property holdings and not on operations. Managers should focus on operations, and the real estate company should take care of the properties." Moreover, it was Røkke and Gjelsten who held the magic formula that could transform the dusty industrial buildings into ringing coin in the cash register. The first move was a stock market listing, or rather; finding a backdoor onto the Oslo Stock Exchange. The solution was the real estate company Avantor, the Andenæs family's old company which had developed, among other things, Oslo Havnelager, but which was leading a dormant existence, marked by the family's financial troubles. It was another friendly raid."

Source:Kjell Inge Røkke (translated)

"Røkke proposed a brilliant approach from his perspective. What about letting Orkla Finans be the financial adviser for both parties? Incredibly, the Andenæs family agreed to the proposal. Thus, the brokerage firm that Røkke had almost single-handedly kept alive was engaged to price the two companies. In return, Avantor would get both the chairman and the CEO in the new company if they just agreed to buy Gjelsten & Røkke Eiendom for the price determined by Orkla Finans. According to the brokerage firm, the values were not small. Deducting debt, Gjelsten & Røkke Eiendom was worth 620 million kroner, Orkla Finans believed. It was quite a value increase from the first, faltering attempts with the Moldehallen in the mid-80s. The golden coup was Elkem Eiendom, which, according to Orkla Finans, was approaching a billion in gross value. Deducting debt, there was no doubt that the effort had more than doubled in just over a year. The Avantor management did not take the values at face value, but, tempted by the bait of filling the leadership positions and with a bit of a discount, a deal was made. The outcome was that Kjell Inge Røkke and Bjørn Rune Gjelsten ended up owning 65 percent of the “new” Avantor. But what about Jan Petter Storetvedt? Did they really sacrifice their loyal property manager to get in through the back door at the Oslo Stock Exchange via Avantor? Not at all, it was just Avantor's CEO Leif E. Johansen who thought so. He celebrated May 17th in the usual way and showed up at Avantor's general meeting the next day to convince the shareholders to accept the offer. They applauded him into the CEO seat for the new major company, and Johansen could face the summer as leader of one of the largest real estate players in the country. Two months later, he was fired by Kjell Inge Røkke because the collaboration allegedly "did not develop as expected." Consequently, Johansen had to walk out with a million in severance pay and left the chief's chair he had occupied for 12 years to Jan Petter Storetvedt. The former chairman Rolf Gulbrandsen remained a bit longer, but by the turn of the year, it was Bjørn Rune Gjelsten who was running the shop. For it is power that rules, and with 65 percent of the shares, there was no doubt about who had the final word."

Source:Kjell Inge Røkke (translated)

"It began in Molde when Storetvedt got the marketing responsibility for the Moldehallen in the old steel building at Bolsønes Verft. At that time, Røkke was mostly in Seattle, while Bjørn Rune Gjelsten managed with GN International. And it is hardly an exaggeration to claim that Røkke's money bag combined with Gjelsten's aggressive investment was what, within a few swift months in the winter of 1992, turned Storetvedt into a significant local property manager. He was responsible for 24,000 square meters by that same summer, and then the massive purchase of Elkem Eiendom was next. Suddenly, Gjelsten & Røkke Eiendom was one of the country's larger real estate companies. It had happened quickly and without any of the industry's real heavyweights managing to grasp what was going on. In Molde, people could hardly believe their eyes; Storetvedt had suddenly become a significant real estate investor."

Source:Kjell Inge Røkke (translated)

"However, Jens P. Heyerdahl is a crafty fox, and he set tough conditions to join the Røkke race. If Orkla were to join, Kjell Inge Røkke and Bjørn Rune Gjelsten had to commit to spending all their time at RGI. At the same time, they had to promise not to engage in private business on the side. If the Orkla boss was going to be a passenger, then he demanded that the two bosses be firmly tied to the driver's seat."

Source:Kjell Inge Røkke (translated)

Appears In Volumes