Erik Torudd

"The dairies did not buy the machines, but rented them for a relatively low cost. Tetra Pak made money instead by charging production royalties and by requiring customers to commit to only buying Tetra Pak’s specially treated paper. When the contracts were drawn up, Erik Torudd wanted a clause that would force customers to pay triple royalty if they used someone else’s paper. However, Holger considered it unnecessary, as Tetra Pak could always sell its paper as cheaply as any competitors. Torudd protested, fearing that paper mills would soon gain access to Dupont’s coating method and start producing equivalent paper on their own. He argued that it wasn’t certain that Tetra Pak would be able to withstand the competition and since the paper was the company’s major source of revenue, it would ultimately threaten the operation. But Holger had Ruben on his side. “Yes, yes, that’s enough for us to take back the machine if there’s any cheating,” Ruben commented. “Are you really willing to take back the machine if it means a whole city then has no milk distribution possibilities?” asked Erik Torudd, who did not believe Ruben was serious. “Of course,” Ruben replied. It turned out as Ruben had said. What Tetra Pak committed to in return for the stringent contract terms was a reliable service organization. It was a factor whose importance could not be underestimated. For a dairy, it would be a minor disaster if the machines came to a stop and the milk spoiled. Tetra Pak promised to quickly fix any faults or immediately supply replacement machines. This unique service would later become one of the company’s most important selling points, if not the most important. Once Tetra Pak had gotten the machines into the dairies, the retailers were the key group, as a retailer convinced that the tetra was much easier to handle would soon stop buying bulk milk for their stores. But Tetra Pak also had to try to overcome consumers’ resistance to buying, since enough protests from consumers could potentially push the dairies to revert to delivering only bulk milk or glass bottles."

"When development had progressed this far, Ruben decided that the milk packaging business should be placed in a separate company. He was well-prepared: as early as 1946, he had applied for the registration of Aktiebolaget Alicante to have on hand in case the tetrahedron became something. Now was the time, and in 1950, on Erik Torudd’s suggestion, the small 10,000-krona company Alicante changed its name to Tetra Pak. It was also decided that the company should be registered in 57 different countries—big plans were being made within the walls of Åkerlund & Rausing’s headquarters. But for now, there was no actual business in Tetra Pak. The development work was still being conducted within the framework of Åkerlund & Rausing. The shares that Ruben had so far been the sole owner of, were transferred after a couple of years to Ruben’s three sons, Gad, Hans, and Sven. They each received 25 percent. The remaining 25 percent went to the partner Holger Crafoord. The sons also took over Ruben’s share in Åkerlund & Rausing. The Rausing share was controlled through AB Vapor."

"Ruben Rausing was far from alone in his skepticism. Erik Torudd saw the tetrahedron for the first time a few days later. He became thoughtful. He has described the event as “a shock.” The package looked like nothing else – not round and not square. And how would one be able to fill it? It was made in one piece. Erik Wallenberg was alone in understanding during the first week that he had really constructed a package that would work. That the little quirky package would lay the foundation for the Rausing family’s entry into the very exclusive circle of billionaires, no one realized. Not even the inventor himself, Erik Wallenberg."

"The first generation of employees, Harry Järund, Erik Torudd, Erik Wallenberg, and others, never fully experienced the fruits of their hard labor. They initiated the technology that was later developed and refined by their successors. The sales department, led by Erik Torudd, did a fantastic job in spreading the Tetra system to a large number of countries and contributed to rapid international expansion. During his time as Deputy CEO in charge of sales, Erik Torudd visited over 100 countries. The task of the salespeople was in a way completely hopeless; they were to sell a strangely designed and leaking package that no rational consumer wanted. But they succeeded."

"Nils Andersson and Gad enthusiastically took on the new project. But despite both of them constantly disparaging Americans and Frenchmen, who were already using the method successfully, their own results were poor. And both Gad and Andersson refused to consult anyone who already mastered the method. Quite soon, people began to wonder what was happening with the project. The reports gave clear signs that something was not right. And they never managed to show any paper where the plastic really stuck. “It’s damn strange that the paper department can’t make paper in the Eagan machine when everyone else apparently can,” Hans commented irritably on the missed development. “It’s not strange at all; they insist on doing everything themselves and refuse to learn from others’ experiences,” Erik Torudd replied. It was not until a year after the construction started that they figured out the temperature required for the plastic to really adhere. And that was due to an accident at work. A temperature regulator had malfunctioned, and the temperature of the extruder had begun to rise uncontrollably. Only then did the plastic adhere. The accident taught the Tetra Pak team something that the French and Americans had known for a long time. Only another year later would the method work well enough that it could be reliably used in production. But then, on the other hand, there were problems with Dupont, who was the rightful patent holder. “There is undoubtedly a patent infringement,” the company’s own patent engineer Tage Norberg also stated when the matter was discussed. However, Tetra Pak was saved by the fact that Erik Torudd had been shown the method already in 1951, and at that time there was no patent. Thus, Dupont had no legal ground against Tetra Pak. For the second time, Tetra Pak had cunningly appropriated a machine design."

"While Ruben showed great satisfaction in finally having removed Holger from the circle of owners, he was also relieved that he wanted to stay on the board. He knew Holger’s good name meant a lot for the opportunities to take up new loans at Tetra Pak. He therefore quickly wrote to Marcus Wallenberg to inform him about the stock takeover, but also to emphasize that Holger would remain on the board. “A limited cooperation will therefore continue, which I am pleased to see,” he wrote in the letter. With the purchase of Holger’s shares, only one step remained for Ruben before the plan for a family-run empire, with his sons as the sole owners, could be realized: he had to remove the remaining six small owners. Therefore, he soon made deals with Torsten Jeppsson and Erik Wallenberg. They sold their shares at nine times par. Harry Järund, Gunnar Brime, and Erik Torudd, however, resisted the Rausing buyout proposals. None of them wanted to sell at the price Ruben had proposed. Erik Torudd did not want to sell at all. Not at any price."

"Most people have at some point experienced suddenly just seeing the solution to a problem in front of them, without really being able to explain why or how they came to the answer. Such a moment occurred that day when Erik Torudd came down to the laboratory and saw how Wallenberg and his assistants took a long paper tube and folded tetrahedrons in a long chain before they split them apart."

"Erik Torudd was hired in 1934 and, like most of the other young, outgoing marketers that Ruben hired, was a business school-educated economist and recommended by Gerhard Törnqvist. Torudd also had a scholarship year in the USA, but unlike many others Ruben hired, he was not particularly tall. However, he had another important qualification: in the USA, he had specifically studied supermarket chains. The phenomenon of supermarkets was still unknown in Sweden, but Gerhard Törnqvist convinced Ruben that it would also take off here."

"In the spring, the company management was forced to start planning for what to do if they still couldn’t get hold of S-50 during the summer. Suddenly in April, what no one had seriously dared to hope for happened. British ICI had finally succeeded in developing a stable high molecular weight polyethylene. It had been seven years since Erik Torudd had asked them to try, seven years which had so far really only been filled with disappointing reports from ICI. Now, the Tetra management could hardly believe the news. But it was true; in their eyes, a pure miracle had saved the business."

"“It was unfortunate that I mentioned Lomma to Hans Rausing because he panicked and now he is running around here or calling and tormenting me several times a day. It’s almost like I can feel my old ulcer,” complained Hilding Borstam who didn’t quite understand Hans’ hysterical reaction. In the confused situation that prevailed, Hans came to the conclusion that the company had to launch a massive advertising campaign specifically targeting the households in Lomma. It was the only way to avoid a stinging defeat, he argued. He nagged intensely at Holger and Erik Torudd. The two of them, with the right of age and experience, had much more ice in their stomach, however, and managed to slow him down. At Erik Torudd’s initiative, they instead began to work the market “from the back.” By filling the newspapers with positive letters to the editor and persuading the journalists to do interviews with the city veterinarian of Lund about the hygienic advantages of tetrapacks, they would win the households over to their side. The tactic was that it would be better to knock out bulk cream with clean weapons rather than trying to manipulate consumers through an advertising campaign, which would likely be seen through. If the tactic of getting the press on their side succeeded, it would all look much more elegant and could be used in later marketing. A few weeks later, it became clear: the tetrapack was on its way to eliminating bulk sales. Tetra Pak had managed to turn the opinion and the company management could breathe easily. This time."

"After the meeting in Rome, a solution to the financing problem was finally found: the small subsidiary Purac, which developed water purification technology. The company had great potential, but had not been managed properly. Gad, who had been appointed CEO, thought it was something he could handle with his left hand, but soon had to realize that it was not that simple. However, he was not the man to solve the problems, but since the company had great development potential, Tetra Pak still managed to sell it for a reasonable price, about 15 million kronor, to American Hercules Powder. That was money that was really needed to be able to continue driving the Tetraproject forward. Ruben and Gad were totally against the sale. Gad because he had planned to keep the company as his own little territory - a way to get revenge for the previous defeats within Tetra Pak. Ruben’s opposition was due to the fact that Purac’s water purification technology, a method that had been discovered by chance when there was a need to purify the water for Östanåbruket, could become a global product if the company was managed correctly. Ruben was against all sales of ideas that could develop into something big. But the sale was pushed through by Hans, Ingvar Wenehed, and Erik Torudd."

"The promise to Ruben practically meant that Erik Torudd took on the role of mentoring Hans in business. It also meant that Torudd’s power position within the company was strengthened, as he acted on Ruben’s mandate."

"In the work with this book, we have not found any signs that Tetra Pak previously used bribes. Rather, the group, as in the case with the launch in India and the Gandhi family, has actively chosen the path of not paying bribes. An exception was, however, during Ruben’s frustration over Lund Dairy’s resistance to adopting the first half-liter tetra pack for milk in 1954. In his desperation, Ruben suggested that they should bribe the managing director Hilding Borstam to adopt the system, but both Hans Rausing and Erik Torudd dissuaded Ruben and made him reconsider."

"Although Harry Järund’s machine was not perfect, it was still a prototype. Ruben seemed relieved. But still, enormous problems remained. There was no material available to coat the paper to make it leak-proof. Wax, which was the usual sealing agent, could not be used as it would break in the folds. It also could not withstand heat sealing; it would melt. Overall, there was no known coating material that would withstand heat sealing without altering the taste of the milk. And if they did succeed in finding an alternative that could be used, how would it be applied to the paper and were there coating machines available? Before the war, Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) in the UK had developed a low molecular weight polyethylene plastic. It was not suitable for coating a tetrahedron, but Stig Sunner believed that a high molecular weight polyethylene would work well for tetra packaging. Erik Torudd, who was in charge of the commercial part of the material issue, contacted ICI to inquire if they could possibly develop such a plastic. If the trials were successful, ICI would become the sole supplier of polyethylene for milk packaging. This was a very tempting bait. Torudd received an affirmative answer, but with the reservation that it would take time."

"When he invited his Deputy CEO, Holger Crafoord, to lunch at the house on Tomegapsgatan, he still was not convinced. Now he wanted to hear what he thought about the tetrahedron’s possibilities. But at the lunch, it was instead Ruben Rausing’s wife, Lisa, who said the liberating words. She suggested exactly the same thing as Erik Torudd had done. But her husband still resisted. “It’s not possible. You cannot seal the packages straight through the milk without it taking on taste,” he objected. “Have you tried?” asked Lisa Rausing."

"After returning to Sweden, Erik Torudd continued to advocate for the use of the S-50 and to apply HP Smith’s method to it. Now, it seemed that the winds were changing within the company. The board of Tetra Pak now included Ruben, Gad, Hans, Holger Crafoord, Erik Torudd, and the company’s skilled lawyer, Carl Borgström. When the dark-suited gentlemen gathered for a board meeting on the morning of February 4, 1952, they decided to build a copy of HP Smith’s machine. Erik Torudd and Harry Järund, who was co-opted onto the board, fought hard against the decision. Both thought it was better to either buy a finished machine or drawings. Otherwise, they risked several years being lost to development. Moreover, they thought it was immoral to copy someone else’s work. But they spoke to deaf ears. Tetra would copy the HP Smith machine. Responsible for the project were the technical genius Nils Andersson and Gad. The decision was bold, but entirely legal. Carr Sherman had voluntarily shown them a design that was not yet patented."

"Without Holger Crafoord’s scouting in the USA in the early 1930s where he reported home about a single-use paper packaging for milk, Erik Wallenberg’s crucial invention in 1944 of a milk packaging in paper shaped like a tetrahedron, Erik Torudd’s ideas about continuous filling, and Harry Järund’s filling machine which solved the problem of producing an affordable packaging and which, through the efforts of many employees, led to an aseptic packaging system for milk and other liquid foods, the Rausing family’s mega-fortune would never have occurred. The story also shows the significance an innovation can have for communities, employees, owners, and other stakeholders, and that many of these stakeholders were also involved in the creation of the innovation. It is not entirely easy to go from an ingenious idea to realizing the idea and taking it out in the market and building up a multinational industrial conglomerate that spreads the innovation globally in the world and which is still market-leading after all these years."

"His increasingly intense wishful thinking also made him want to start building three new laminators according to the same model. However, it wasn’t three new laminators that were needed but more S-50. The problem was that the American military’s need for S-50 plastic meant that it was running out in the market. The Korean War had made S-50 be regarded as a strategic commodity – everything produced went directly to the military. Erik Torudd had to desperately call all the companies that had received samples of S-50 and ask them to send it to Tetra Pak. But the small amount he gathered would not last past August 1953. After that, they would be without viable coating material. Torudd managed to get an audience with the United States Army Quartermaster General to submit a request that Enjay and Tetra Pak be allowed to buy 1,000 tons of S-50 from Standard Oil. The petition was submitted unsuccessfully."

"As the big day approached, there was some doubt among the ranks about whether people would really come. Sweden was going to play Hungary in football the same day as the gathering would take place. To enable as many as possible to participate, Erik Torudd and Sven Lundberg therefore decided to split the information meeting into three different sessions throughout the day. They also realized that they needed some sort of attraction to draw people in. When the doors were flung open to the grand ball and concert halls of the Winter Palace at Norra Bantorget in Stockholm, people poured in. The great film and revue actors Stig Järrel, Sickan Carlsson, and Gösta Bernhard warmed up the audience with some entertainment. Then Erik Torudd took over and accounted for sales figures from Lund. They showed that retailers who sold cream in bulk only earned five öre per half liter. The reason was mainly the loss that occurred during the measurements in the cream measures. With tetra packaging, however, the stores could earn 20 öre per half liter, claimed Erik Torudd. The three performances were a success. In total, over 5,000 people came and the week after, Stockholm’s tetra sales increased from 3,000 to an incredible 43,000 packages."

"From 1934, the company began to make a profit. One of the major advances was when the company managed to get several bakeries to switch to packing their bread using the so-called Pertinex method, which was developed by Åkerlund & Rausing. The method, which involved wrapping the breads in waxed paper at the bakeries, made them more durable and thus easier to transport to the stores. The company also got the textile industry to switch to delivering their garments in decorated cardboard boxes. Another important advance was when the newly hired salesman, Erik Torudd, succeeded in 1935 in getting the cutlery company Gustav Eriksson’s Nysilverfabrik in Eskilstuna to switch to packaging their goods in specially made packages. The deal with Gustav Eriksson’s became a major breakthrough in the entire city: eventually, almost all Eskilstuna companies switched to packaging their goods with the help of Åkerlund & Rausing."

"“May I see the machine?” wondered Torudd. But there was a limit to Sherman’s openness. The method and the machine were patent pending, but the patent had not yet been granted. Therefore, he was very careful about who could see the machine. Erik Torudd could not control his impatience. Here he was opposite a man who might hold the answer to the question of how the tetrahedron would be plastic-coated. “If I arrange a roll of paper of the right quality and enough quantity of S-50, are you then willing to test if it works?” “Absolutely,” Carr Sherman replied spontaneously. Erik Torudd was beside himself with joy. Now it was important not to waste any time unnecessarily. When he returned to his hotel room, he immediately called the American plastics company Sarnia and ordered S-50, and from International Paper, he ordered a roll of cardboard. By doing so, he would avoid the long transports and problems with customs that would arise if he ordered from the usual suppliers, Billerud and Uddeholm."

"When laboratory experiments showed that it was possible to seal the paper with heat without affecting the taste of milk, Rausing wanted Erik Torudd’s continuous filling to be patented immediately. However, he bypassed Erik Torudd, who was the inventor. Instead, he contacted Tage Nilsson at AW Andersson. Since he was completely non-technical, it was Nilsson who had to make the drawings for the patent application that was filed in August. Ruben Rausing himself was listed as the inventor."

"On October 21, 1978, the first formal order for 16 aseptic packaging machines was written. After more than 20 years of work and at the ages of 83 and 68 respectively, the two fighters Ruben and Erik Torudd finally began to approach their goal. Between October and January, the machines were ordered for the lamination factory. Finally, at the end of 1979, Torudd could visit the upcoming lamination factory in Itola near the city of Baroda. There, an educational center for aseptic machines, an aseptic dairy, and a service center would also be built. The ownership issue was settled in January when it was agreed that Tetra Pak would invest three million rupees or equivalent to 20 percent of the joint venture’s share capital. The remaining 80 percent would be owned by IDC. The company was named Indian Dairy Packaging Co Ltd (INDCL) and would have a total share capital of 15 million rupees."

"He tasked Torudd to immediately apply for a patent for Wallenberg’s tetrahedron. And the drawings of the tetrahedron were handed over to the patent firm AW Andersson in Malmö, so they could write the patent application. Erik Torudd had a hard time getting the agency’s representatives to understand that the tetrahedron really was an invention and that it truly could be used as packaging. Eventually, Rausing became irritated and instructed Torudd to call a meeting with the patent firm."

"Even Douglas Draffan was caught up in the purges. He was forced away from his life’s work and moved back to the United Kingdom. Instead, a Kenyan took over as CEO of the cooperative. Erik Torudd became worried since he was uncertain whether the new, poorly educated CEO would manage the job and therefore moved Tetra Pak’s service manager in Japan, Torbjörn Nilsson, to Kenya. His only task was to oversee the cooperative’s facilities to ensure that paper and spare parts were ordered on time. The system with Nilsson as the “supervisor” worked excellently."

"One of Erik Torudd’s tasks during his trips abroad was to keep an eye out for new materials and packaging systems that Åkerlund & Rausing could introduce in Sweden. During a trip to the USA in the spring of 1951, he decided to visit the world’s largest slaughterhouse, Swifts in Chicago. He was curious about how they packaged meat, an area Åkerlund & Rausing had not yet ventured into, but which could yield significant revenues if the right method was found."

"When Ruben’s skepticism towards Erik Wallenberg’s tetrahedron finally eased and he began to be intrigued by its different shape – it stimulated his imagination – he chose to commit fully to it. Erik Torudd did the same, even though many in his surroundings told him he was completely crazy to waste time on that silly little paper pyramid. But what set Erik Torudd and Ruben apart from the detractors was that they really could see the potential in what was different. They were not as guided by conventions as most others. Both became completely convinced that the little tetrahedron would become a world product. But how big? Well, they didn’t even dare to speculate."

"Erik Torudd actually didn’t want to start working with Ruben at all. He planned to start Sweden’s first supermarket chain himself, after realizing how much money could be made from it. But when Törnqvist reminded him that there was an establishment ban on new grocery stores, he realized that the plan was not easy to implement. Instead, he let himself be persuaded to invest in Ruben’s packaging company – at least for the time being."

"The new organization would start when Tetra Pak moved into its own premises. This was planned to happen in a few years. For Ruben, it was time to realize his dynasty plans. Even if it meant that two completely inexperienced sons would get top positions in the company. Gad was 30 and had a degree in chemistry and archaeology. Little brother Hans, who would become CEO, was 26 and had studied economics, business administration, and languages at university. Although forming the dynasty was primary for Ruben, there was one thing he was terrified of: that Erik Torudd would see the organizational plan as a provocation and decide to leave the company as the inexperienced Hans became his superior."

"The new organization would start when Tetra Pak moved into its own premises. This was planned to happen in a few years. For Ruben, it was time to realize his dynasty plans. Even if it meant that two completely inexperienced sons would get top positions in the company. Gad was 30 and had a degree in chemistry and archaeology. Little brother Hans, who would become CEO, was 26 and had studied economics, business administration, and languages at university. Although forming the dynasty was primary for Ruben, there was one thing he was terrified of: that Erik Torudd would see the organizational plan as a provocation and decide to leave the company as the inexperienced Hans became his superior."

"It was not until further into the new year that Ruben’s worries were alleviated. After much reflection over the Christmas and New Year holidays, Torudd explained to him that he accepted the new organization, although he had some objections. Among other things, he believed that Hans should have more sales experience before being made CEO. Ruben agreed and added relieved: “I hope that the cooperation between you two really becomes intimate.” “I hope so too. And I also believe it can be – provided that each one is clear about their tasks,” Erik Torudd replied, thereby clarifying that he would not accept Hans interfering in his work."

"At a meeting between Ruben, Erik Torudd, and the company’s lawyer, Carl Borgström, Ruben initially refused to acknowledge that Benzon was the true inventor. However, after some persuasion, he was forced to recognize the accomplished fact: that Boye Benzon could sue both Ruben and the company. But even then, he did not want to admit that Benzon was the true inventor. He had a very different perception of who is an inventor and who is not. “We constantly come back to the same question: Who really is an inventor, the person who orders a solution to a problem or the one who comes up with the solution?” he argued against the more conventional definition of inventor that Torudd and Borgström advocated."

"Already in 1948, they showed the machine to the packaging manufacturer Dobeckmun in hopes that the company would undertake to manufacture and sell the paper on a license. Tetra Pak also tried to interest other packaging companies, including Marathon, Shellmar, and Milprint. At the same time, they began to investigate which American company could sell both machines and paper for Tetra Pak. The company they ultimately chose was the world’s largest packaging industry, Continental Can. Unlike its fiercest competitor, American Can, it had no paper milk packaging. However, Continental Can did make tin cans for canned milk for the dairy industry. Thus, the company already had established contacts with the dairies, which was exactly what Tetra Pak was striving for. Erik Torudd was sent off to establish contact with the leadership of Continental Can."

"“If I think about what they have meant to us - Erik Wallenberg, through his Tetra invention, Gunnar Brime through 27 years of activity in ÅR, Torsten Jeppsson through his devoted, tremendously hard work over many years, Harry Järund through his inventing activities, Stig Sunner through his scientific advising, Erik Torudd for his commitment to Tetra Pak from the very first minute, Göte Engfors through his 20-year, significantly underpaid directorship in our various companies, and Carl Borgström’s exceptionally important advising for our operations - then the price you mention, as far as I can judge, is really not reasonable,” he continued. But Holger never had the chance to carry out his plan to help the remaining small shareholders."

"Now Holger could start cleaning up the organization for real. The first action was to put Hans and Gad in their place. “Tetra Pak is bankrupt. It is now under administration. And decisions about expenditures can from now on only be made by me,” he informed them in brusque terms. He was right. The company was ready for bankruptcy if any of the creditors demanded their money back. In fact, since 1956, the company had been obligated to prepare a balance sheet for checking, but they had ignored it so that no outsider would see how badly off it was. “If Hans had not been a son in the house, he would not have stayed another ten minutes,” Holger told Erik Torudd."

"Gustafson succeeded in what few within the company believed he would manage: to produce an aseptic Tetra Brik machine that worked flawlessly. By the spring of 1972, the new, improved design was ready and many within the company management were amazed. Hans, who had led the Brik project, but who had started to doubt it over the last two years, could not believe his eyes. Erik Torudd, who had never believed in Brik, wanted to wait and see until the machine was tested out in the field. Ruben was relieved, although in the long run, he expected Rigello to outdo Brik as the company’s most important product."

"Boye Benzon, one of the designers at Åkerlund & Rausing, invented a handle that was clamped onto the long side of the tetra where the seal was located. As a result, the tetra could function like a regular jug, only made of paper. Harry Järund believed that the handle was so good that it did not require any further development work. However, when he presented the idea to Ruben, he received no response at all. Ruben could not see anything good about the handle. But a month later, after he had finished contemplating, he wanted the handle to be patented as soon as possible. The strange thing was that in front of Erik Torudd, who was to draft the patent application, he claimed that he himself was the inventor. Torudd, who knew the true circumstances, advised Ruben against it and stated that he wanted nothing to do with the matter."

"Other dairies became skeptical when they saw how poor paper deliveries disrupted production and deliveries at the dairies that had bought the system. And when the French market began to be cultivated, the authorities were coldly disposed, as they had seen what happened when the Dutch dairies received poor paper and the milk lay in pools under the tetra machines. They questioned whether any import licenses for Tetra Pak products should be issued at all. Erik Torudd and his salespeople were truly working against the wind."

"“No, this won’t do. We have to grab the bull by the horns and turn the opinion in our favor,” protested Erik Torudd. “We have to do a proper market survey in Eskilstuna and phrase the questions so that the outcome favors us instead of the loose-weight milk,” he suggested. But he received no support. “No, no, there will be no survey,” said Ruben. “If we don’t do it, the housewives will do it themselves,” responded Torudd, meaning that the consumers would prove in practice that they did not want the tetra."

"But that was not the only problem. Since coming to power in 1966, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had increasingly begun to centralize control over India. For Verghese Kurien, it became increasingly apparent that it was the Gandhi family themselves who were obstructing Tetra Pak. Since her accession, Indira Gandhi had begun to promote her son Sanjay as an informal crown prince. Just like Ruben wanted to build a dynasty, albeit a political one. With the mother’s behavior, this situation led to Sanjay Gandhi obtaining a strong unofficial position of power. Kurien had drawn the right conclusions but felt ashamed in front of Erik Torudd. He simply did not want Torudd to see how corrupt the Indian administration was and how developed nepotism was in political India. He kept quiet."