Entity Dossier
entity

Kaupthing

Strategic Concepts & Mechanics

Capital StrategyPartnership Over Solo Risk Taking
Cornerstone MoveReverse Takeover Financial Engineering
Strategic PatternExit Before Market Recognition
Risk DoctrinePersonal Guarantee Risk Calibration
Signature MoveDe-Risk Through Deal Flow
Signature MoveLocal Knowledge as Barrier Advantage
Signature MoveSubmarine Strategy Market Entry
Signature MoveMaximum Leverage on High Conviction
Cornerstone MovePrivatization Consortium Assembly
Risk DoctrineLow Profile High Stakes Strategy
Operating PrincipleModular Scalability Design Principle
Decision FrameworkIntuition Over Analysis Doctrine
Strategic PatternChaos as Opportunity Window
Operating PrinciplePivot Only With Clean Breaks
Signature MoveGut Instinct As Greenlight
Signature MoveRadical Focus After Overreach
Identity & CultureStakeholder Alignment Through Personal Skin
Cornerstone MoveCopy-Paste Playbook Transplants
Cornerstone MoveLeverage-to-Ownership Flywheel
Decision FrameworkSweaty Palms as Danger Signal
Identity & CultureCompetition as Survival Doctrine
Strategic PatternOpportunity in Macro Disarray
Competitive AdvantageBrand as Rebellion Weapon
Signature MoveStealth Launches And Submarine Strategy
Strategic PatternStealth Before Scale
Signature MovePersonal Guarantees—High-Stakes Commitment
Signature MoveDeal Junkie Portfolio Cycling
Cornerstone MoveCrisis Entry, Post-Collapse Creation
Relationship LeverageTrusted Core Teams Across Borders
Operating PrincipleCuriosity as Growth Compass

Primary Evidence

"It is a fact that the governor of the Central Bank and the prime minister had a phone call to discuss the loan to Kaupthing, but what the two men said has never been revealed, even though the call was recorded and the parliament itself asked for the information. The prime minister, who didn’t know at the time that the conversation was being recorded, has vetoed all requests to make it public."

Source:Billions to Bust and Back

"That is not altogether unreasonable: Landsbanki, Kaupthing and Glitnir rank in the world’s top ten biggest banking bankruptcies, and when combined as one big Icelandic banking collapse would rank as the third-largest corporate collapse in history. Foreign banking institutions alone were said to have lost €30 billion in the crisis. And, at the time of the 2008 crash, I reckon I was the largest personal investor in Iceland’s economy. In hindsight, I should have never put so much money at risk in Iceland."

Source:Billions to Bust – And Beyond

"When I wanted to radically change Straumur to de-risk it and bring in professional management from abroad, I got into a major debate with two fellow shareholders and board members who in different ways were products of the kind of false thinking prevalent in Iceland at the time. One of them had an old Icelandic money background and the other had inherited a fishing business. Thordur Mar Johannesson, Straumur’s CEO, had advised both of them to leverage up their family companies through the bank. To them, he was incredibly smart but they didn’t have a clue about what they were doing. When I said: ‘We have got to change management,’ they said: ‘Why? This guy is brilliant.’ I replied: ‘He’s brilliant now but the amount of risk we have in the company by always betting on local bank shares rising is crazy. We could go pop just like that.’ He had built up a large position in Glitnir, managed to sell it profitably and now wanted to do the same again with Kaupthing shares. It was a one trick show and lacked any vision to build a diversified business. They didn’t see the danger signs. They had maybe €100 million to their name but it was all done through Johannesson, who had leveraged them up and put them into various businesses and instruments. They were sky high on monopoly money and just wanted to take more and more turns. They had no sense that this was not a game."

Source:Billions to Bust – And Beyond

Appears In Volumes