NBC
Strategic Concepts & Mechanics
Primary Evidence
"By one tally, we had spent $3 billion by 1987 for more than 150 cable companies, giving TCI reach into nearly 20 percent of U.S. homes. We had a sufficient lead—nearly twice as large as the number two player, Time Inc.’s ATC. A year later, we had no earnings but posted cash flow of $850 million—more than the cash flow of ABC, CBS, and NBC combined."
"Federal law forbids any noncitizen from owning TV stations, so Rupert Murdoch became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1985 and quickly set about assembling a formidable media empire. He brazenly bought up some of the crown jewels of American media, such as the 20th Century-Fox movie studio. And amid the sneers of skeptics, Rupert launched a fourth U.S. broadcast network, the Fox Broadcasting Company, challenging the dominance of ABC, CBS, and NBC. After buying Metromedia’s TV stations, securing a foothold in key markets, he enlisted as CEO Hollywood heavyweight Barry Diller, who crafted a strategy around younger audiences and unconventional shows like *The Simpsons* and *Married… with Children.* Fox defied the odds and reshaped the American television market in the process. I learned from Rupert’s approach—aggressive and direct, the kind of competitor who was deadly because he was so quick to draw and fire. He tackled challenges head-on—whether from regulators, competitors, or his own team—and always found ways to navigate around obstacles. And he’s never, ever been afraid to buck the system. I respected that."
"As word got out I was looking, I got a call from Steve Ross at Warner. He was an impeccably dressed and roguishly charming media visionary charging against the Big Three television networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC) that dominated broadcasting with unprecedented news and entertainment choices. Ross had parleyed his early start in the funeral parlor business into what would one day become one of the largest entertainment companies in the world, Time Warner."
"JC and I had an early meeting at the convention center, and we walked the show floor before. What we saw opened our sleepy eyes—workers setting up booth after booth for new channels, including HBO, Showtime, ESPN, Nickelodeon, and MTV—more than we had ever seen before and nothing like we had expected. No longer would cable TV be a community antenna service merely bringing in the Big Three broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC). These companies were coalescing into a completely different business, an unprecedented platform for networks of all kinds: movies, music, news, history, education, food, and so much more. Millions of TV homes in America would want more choice in the channels they watched."
"If business is war, and it certainly feels like it sometimes, I was thrilled we had a new weapon in digital compression, but it was not ours alone. Soon others would exploit its power, too. And as I looked at the broader North American battle map, our flank was exposed. The most immediate threat was the satellite companies—not the makers of the big ten-foot C-band dishes, but a new generation of smaller dishes and powerful satellites that could leverage digital compression from space—without the need for wires. One early gambit, called Sky Cable, promised 108 channels, twice as many channels as most cable systems back then, to a dish a mere eighteen inches in diameter—about the size of a pizza pan. The venture drew deep-pocketed backers, including General Motors’ Hughes Communications; General Electric’s NBC; News Corp., owner of 20th Century Fox Studios; and Cablevision Systems Corporation. Lucky for us, just a year later, the high-cost Sky Cable partnership imploded."
"Just as I had with the *Movie of the Week* at ABC, I was again starting all alone to try to establish a new television network. There I was with my big idea, my theory that there ought to be an alternative to CBS/NBC/ABC. I knew instinctively that there should be more options than three look-alike networks and wasn’t daunted by how many tries before had failed. I just knew it was time to try this. But how to turn that blue-sky idea into an actual plan? We now had this backbone of Metromedia stations, but how would we find enough other stations to be viable, to cover the rest of the country? What kind of programming would work? It wasn’t as if anyone was clamoring for a fourth network. Even though the three networks had basically morphed into one bland blob, there wasn’t any factual evidence to support starting one. But I was sure it could be done."
"As that feeling swelled, I went to have lunch with Jack Welch, the chairman of GE, which owned NBC. He was deeply unhappy with the network’s performance. It was a disaster, and I thought it would be fun, even exciting, to try to turn it around. And Jack was encouraging, as he was toying with the idea of selling it. I wondered if I could raise the necessary money, but quickly realized I couldn’t pursue that while being an employee of one of its competitors. The truth was I couldn’t pursue anything without quitting Fox, without being independent. But that prospect frightened me into inaction. How could I turn from my exalted position to standing out in the cold without the protection of a big company behind me? The very thought froze me."
"The elegant and suave William S. Paley, CBS’s chairman, would never have introduced himself to a new employee in the public elevator, because Paley had his own private elevator. Also, he was a time-honored snob and would have looked at my unruly suit and bad shoes and wondered what the hell I was doing in his classic Eero Saarinen building. At NBC, I would never have been greeted by Robert Sarnoff, its leader at the time and son of the founder, David Sarnoff. I would have quivered in the ornate lobby of the grand RCA Building, wondering which of the fifteen elevators I was supposed to take."
"Over time, the distinct images of the three networks had blended together. Initially, CBS had been Tiffany, NBC was live “specials” and color, and ABC was the shoot-from-the-hip network that would try anything. ABC had become number one, and as the other two tried to compete, the programming for all three networks had grown very similar. I’d always been a contrarian counterprogrammer and believed this opened the opportunity to start a brand-new independent network and began to scope out how to get it launched."
"Definitely, Azcárraga Vidaurreta had the best facilities. In September 1943 he had begun to build a large broadcasting station on Avenida Chapultepec, which was to be called Radiópolis. But in 1947, in a moment of visionary anticipation, Azcárraga halted the work to redefine his strategy. The future, he concluded, was not in radio but on the small screen. Perhaps NBC’s unprecedented success in televising the 1947 World Series inspired this change of mind. In any case, realizing that television would be considerably more expensive, both in equipment and in program production, he began selling his provincial radio stations in order to raise more capital. When he resumed work on Avenida Chapultepec, it was no longer to build Radiópolis, but Televicentro."
"The sharks were swimming around RCA. The company’s performance, driven by a reinvigorated NBC, had been improving rapidly. But despite an increase in revenue and earnings, its stock price remained flat. This was precisely the sort of financial paradox that suggested an undervalued company. Of course, the corporate raiders couldn’t help noticing. And the word went out on Wall Street: RCA was an appealing takeover target."
"“There’s nobody in this business at ABC, NBC, or CBS who doesn’t know one thing,’’ Tisch said. “The show is the thing. But by the same token, if you carry that to extremes, it’s like the guy who drowned in an average of 12 inches of water. Sure the show is the thing. Everybody knows that; but do you sit around having the money pour out in waste while you go around saying the show is the thing?”"
"As part of his continuing education on the business, Larry Tisch traveled to Hollywood to meet the industry’s most successful enter' tainment executives—Michael Eisner of Walt Disney Co., Barry Diller, then CEO and chairman of Fox Inc., and Robert Daly, then chairman and chief executive of Warner Brothers Inc. These were the people who packaged and produced the programs that formed a network’s lifeblood. CBS, he recognized, needed the equivalent of a Grant Tinker and a Brandon Tartikoff. Tartikoff had developed the idea of “The Cosby Show,” which at that point was a major reason for NBC’s passing CBS in the ratings. Tisch wanted to know how they did it. He asked everyone who ought to know, unconcerned about the possibility of sounding ignorant."