Entity Dossier
entity

Nextel Chile

Strategic Concepts & Mechanics

Operating PrinciplePivot Only With Clean Breaks
Signature MoveGut Instinct As Greenlight
Signature MoveRadical Focus After Overreach
Identity & CultureStakeholder Alignment Through Personal Skin
Cornerstone MoveCopy-Paste Playbook Transplants
Cornerstone MoveLeverage-to-Ownership Flywheel
Decision FrameworkSweaty Palms as Danger Signal
Identity & CultureCompetition as Survival Doctrine
Strategic PatternOpportunity in Macro Disarray
Competitive AdvantageBrand as Rebellion Weapon
Signature MoveStealth Launches And Submarine Strategy
Strategic PatternStealth Before Scale
Signature MovePersonal Guarantees—High-Stakes Commitment
Signature MoveDeal Junkie Portfolio Cycling
Cornerstone MoveCrisis Entry, Post-Collapse Creation
Relationship LeverageTrusted Core Teams Across Borders
Operating PrincipleCuriosity as Growth Compass

Primary Evidence

"Mobile telecoms was a sector I knew well, having grown Play, my start-up in Poland, into a top-four independent challenger brand, and although Chile was on the other side of the Atlantic, it did bear some similarities to Play’s Polish homeland. Both were Catholic cultures with a high degree of conservatism. Another element they had in common was their domination by international behemoths. While Play in Poland was up against France’s Orange, Deutsche Telekom’s T-Mobile and Polkomtel, whose Plus brand was 24 per cent owned by Britain’s Vodafone, Nextel Chile had to contend with Entel, the former nationalised Chilean telecoms company whose 127-metre Torre Entel literally towers over central Santiago. Entel controlled about 30 per cent of the Chilean mobile telecoms market. Then there were Movistar, owned by Spanish giant Telefonica, which held a market share of around 28 per cent, and Claro, part of the America Movil telecoms giant, famously fronted by Mexican billionaire Carlos Slim, which had 23 per cent. Nextel Chile had possessed about 2 per cent of the market as a total underdog, and even that was falling steadily. However, we had grown Play from nothing into the leading mobile telecoms company in Poland with a 27 per cent market share, and we saw a similar potential growth trajectory for this Chilean minnow. The financial elements of a deal had to be put together very quickly. We completed the whole transaction in about two months and it was only later that we learned how close Nextel Chile had actually been to bankruptcy wipe-out. We refinanced the company with $400 million of equity and $420 million of debt and set about finding a way to rebrand and reposition it as a vibrant independent challenger brand – a far cry from its previous image as a distant South American offshoot of a major US carrier."

Source:Billions to Bust – And Beyond

"Nextel Chile had seemed like a good idea to the founders of its US parent, Nextel Corporation, which was founded in Virginia in 1987 and quickly became one of the first telecoms providers in the US to offer a national digital cellular coverage footprint. By 2015, however, the parent company had merged with Sprint and the Chilean business was in trouble, with only 200,000 subscribers in a nation of 19.5 million people and just days away from seeking protection from creditors under America’s [Chapter 11](private://read/01kdksn7jhqrm0f2m3d6xxdngv/ch11.xhtml#ch11) bankruptcy code."

Source:Billions to Bust – And Beyond

Appears In Volumes