Entity Dossier
entity

Nissan

Strategic Concepts & Mechanics

Strategic ManeuverShape the Market Before You Enter It
Mental ModelTrust Is the Bandwidth of Implicit Communication
Structural VulnerabilityBad News Is the Only Useful Intelligence
Implementation TacticSchwerpunkt Over Vision Statement
Strategic PatternAmbiguity Outperforms Deception
Strategic ManeuverEngage with the Expected, Win with the Surprise
Decision FrameworkBe the Customer Literally
Mental ModelReorientation Speed Beats Execution Speed
Identity & CultureGardens Not Machines
Operating PrincipleDirections Beat Goals
Competitive AdvantageGroup Feeling as the Ruling Factor
Strategic ManeuverReconnaissance Pull Over Central Planning
Strategic ManeuverDelight Is the Ch'i of Business
Implementation TacticFingerspitzengefühl Through Decades, Not Seminars
Mental ModelIf You Can Be Modeled, You Have No Strategy
Strategic PatternToyota as Maneuver Warfare in Manufacturing
Mental ModelFog Grows Inside the Slower Organization
Implementation TacticPromote the Doers, Remove the Resisters — One Night
Competitive AdvantageSnowmobile Building as Innovation
Operating PrincipleOrientation as the Schwerpunkt
Implementation TacticThe Mission Contract Replaces Over-Control

Primary Evidence

"At Nissan and Toyota, project managers for new models enjoy total control over the car’s design and engineering. Senior managers, even the president of the corporation, are forbidden from interfering, once they have approved the project. As long ago as 1989, Nissan developed the Maxima in 30 months, roughly half the US industry’s average at the time and well below it even today, with such quality that the year it was introduced, it topped the J. D. Power initial quality survey."

Source:Certain to Win

"In fact, the period of greatest Japanese success was the following decade. During the 1980s, for example, General Motors’ US market share went from 52% to around 30%, with most of this lost to the Japanese. What happened? Ask anyone who bought a Honda, Toyota, or Datsun (as Nissan products were known until 1984) back then. They came expecting to get great gas mileage, which they did, but, “Surprise!” The things ran like a Swiss watch, fit together like a Rolls Royce, and seemed to last forever. In the language of strategy, the Japanese engaged with the expected (cheng)—gas mileage—but won with the unexpected (ch’i): fit and finish, driveability, longevity. Contrast this with GM’s economy offerings of the period, the Vega and Chevette. Their gas mileage was as good as the Japanese, but in all other aspects, they were pretty ordinary. All cheng; no ch’i. Market share cut by 40%."

Source:Certain to Win

Appears In Volumes