Rubinstein
Strategic Concepts & Mechanics
Primary Evidence
"Rubinstein says it was about to be approved for production. But when Hillman presented the process matter-of-factly, describing how the vertebrae would first attach to the base, and then be moved to the next line for the internal computer components to be stuffed inside, the challenges of the complicated design became clear. The process was in opposition to standard procedures, because usually you’d want to build each component and then, as a last step, bring them all together in the enclosure. But Hillman, responding to the demands of ID, was instead beginning with the enclosure, introducing the possibility of scratches and dings that could result in expensive manual rework. Jobs was listening and watching intently. He leaned over the table, pointed at parts, and picked a few up as he digested the process. Then he stood up abruptly and was right in Hillman’s face. “Are you telling me *that’s* the assembly method?” Jobs asked. As Hillman started to answer, Jobs interjected: “That’s so fucking stupid!”"
"Rubinstein was floored by Terry Gou’s ability to turn vision into reality at inexplicable speed. In America, he says now, nine months wouldn’t be enough time for a greenfield site to have attained the permits to start building. “These aren’t necessarily bad things, by the way,” he says. “It’s just not the way it is. And so we’re not competitive.” From a distance it appeared that Foxconn could go from zero products to 100,000 *per day* with ease. Other Chinese groups could best Foxconn in quality or match them in time to market—the period between taking a design and building the first batch. But nobody could match Foxconn in time to volume—how long it took to build a product in great quantities."