Siemens

"ments. Such strategy placed ITT in an ideal situation to parlay World War II into an economic triumph. Behn was one of the few who could make meaningful long-range plans — no matter which side won. He waited, watching the fortunes of war, until a discernible pattern of victory emerged. Then, shazam — although ITT had been accused of Axis collaboration at the beginning of the war, Behn emerged as a conquering Allied hero, of sorts. He was the man with strong political influence and business interests all over Europe. As the Allied armies mopped up, Behn was personally on the scene to restore the ITT empire before the military governors could piece things together. And even more remarkably, ITT managed to carry off the role of victim of World War II and file a $30 million claim for damages which recently the United States government has seen fit to pay. So, with discreetly applied pressures and much chutzpah, Behn managed to have it both ways. If the Germans had won, who could tell what rewards would have befallen the faithful industrial empires of Krupp, Siemens, Mercedes, and the several German equivalents of ITT."

"But the arrangements could also be dangerous. Numerous companies avoided entering China in the 1990s due to the risks and uncertainties of IP protection. Once China entered the WTO in 2001, however, explicitly conditioning market access on tech transfer was illegal in most sectors. As President Clinton had put it: “We don’t have to transfer technology or do joint manufacturing in China anymore.” But the practice didn’t really end; instead, the pressure turned informal. The Chinese market was so large that foreign companies would sometimes “voluntarily” enter such agreements. A textbook example occurred in the early 2000s when China planned the largest high-speed rail network in the world. The potential orders to foreign companies were enormous, creating a Prisoner’s Dilemma among Siemens, Bombardier, and Kawasaki. In the end, all three agreed to transfer technology to state-backed companies in exchange for market access. By 2010, policy had shifted to favor local industry; the foreign companies struggled to compete in China, and the local companies began exporting their technology abroad. As one Japanese executive involved put it: “[The Japanese and Europeans] were afraid this situation would happen in the future, but they thought it would take more time. The Chinese catch-up speed was so fast; they could not have imagined they would be competing [with the Chinese] for contracts in the US.”"

"The dotcom crisis reshaped tech manufacturing for years to come. In the prior decade, leading contract manufacturers had begun to purchase factories from major brands including IBM, Texas Instruments, Ericsson, Siemens, and Lucent. The deals were often seen as a win-win, with the big brands saving on costs. Negative media headlines could be avoided, since factories were not being shuttered so much as being put under new management. When Apple sold its Fountain, Colorado, factory in 1996, most of its 1,100 employees simply got a new uniform. But the result was a huge transfer in practical knowledge from the computer brands to the contract manufacturers."