Entity Dossier
entity

Texaco

Strategic Concepts & Mechanics

Signature MoveStiritz: Poker-Player Odds on Back-of-Envelope LBOs
Operating PrincipleBlank Calendar as Competitive Edge
Cornerstone MoveOne-Page Analysis Then Pounce
Signature MoveMalone: Scale as Virtuous Cycle, Tax as Obsession
Cornerstone MoveAnarchic Decentralization, Dictatorial Capital Control
Risk DoctrineInstitutional Imperative as CEO Kryptonite
Decision FrameworkHurdle Rate as Supreme Filter
Signature MoveSingleton: Phone Booth Tender at All-Time-Low Multiples
Cornerstone MoveSuction Hose Buybacks at Maximum Pessimism
Cornerstone MoveCash Flow as True North, Not Reported Earnings
Signature MoveAnders: Sell Your Favorite Division Without Blinking
Identity & CultureEngineers Over MBAs at the Helm
Competitive AdvantageConcentrated Bets Over Diversified Dribbles
Signature MoveMurphy: Leave Something on the Table Then Lever Up
Capital StrategyTax Counsel Before Every Transaction
Operating PrinciplePer-Share Value Not Longest Train
Signature MoveBuffett: Float Flywheel from Insurance to Empire
Strategic PatternGreedy When Others Are Fearful
Risk DoctrineNo Cross-Pledging of Crown Jewels
Signature MoveDeals Hated, Strategy Loved
Signature MoveNever Run Out of Cheque-Writing Time
Relationship LeverageShare the Pie to Keep the Table
Strategic PatternEcho Bay Model Then Surpass It
Signature MoveKlosters Mountain as Strategic War Room
Identity & CultureRefugee Hunger as Permanent Engine
Cornerstone MoveWritten Memo Then Unanimous Sign-Off
Identity & CultureReturn to Canada Only With Success
Cornerstone MoveBuy Producing Assets at Cycle Bottom, Never Explore
Signature MoveTrust Mining Operators Then Stay Away
Operating PrincipleFocus as Compensation for Ordinary Talent
Cornerstone MoveBorrow Against the Asset to Buy the Asset
Decision FrameworkGeopolitical Disruption as Buy Signal
Strategic PatternScarcity Premium as Entry Signal
Signature MoveControl Without Majority Ownership
Cornerstone MoveOutsider-to-Kingpin Control Loops
Strategic PatternWinning Through Distressed Takeovers
Relationship LeverageCourt of Brokers and Right Hands
Cornerstone MoveAsset Cycling to Capture Volatility
Signature MoveNo-Sentiment Steel Disposal
Strategic PatternOption-Loaded Contract Structures
Risk DoctrineTax Residency as Strategic Moat
Signature MoveMicro-Managed Outsourced Operations
Decision FrameworkBuy Control, Outsource Operations
Competitive AdvantageInformation Edge from Broker Web
Operating PrincipleNo Sentiment for Old Steel
Signature MoveShareholder Cash-Flow Relentlessness
Operating PrincipleDeal-First, Fix-Later Mentality
Cornerstone MoveDeal With Myself for Maximum Leverage
Risk DoctrineFlags and Structures as Shields
Signature MoveRisk Appetite As Primary Weapon

Primary Evidence

"His top holdings were invariably companies he knew well (including smaller conglomerates like Curtiss-Wright and large energy and insurance companies like Texaco and Aetna), whose P/E ratios were at or near record lows at the time of his investment."

Source:The Outsiders_ Eight Unconventional CEOs and Their Radically Rational Blueprint for Success

"The Mercur mine in Utah was Munk’s next acquisition target, and Bob Smith was front and centre in the decision to go for it. Mercur was owned by Texaco, but had originally been developed by the mining arm of Getty Oil Company. With permission from Texaco White Plains’ senior executive, Peter Byur (later Texaco’s chairman and CEO), Munk sent his newly acquired Camflo team of mining engineers to do a two-day appraisal of Mercur. Bob Smith, the chief, took two of his Camflo geologists with him, Brian Meikle, a McGill graduate, and Alan Hill, a former Noranda mine manager. Smith and his team liked what they saw. Mercur was producing 70,000 ounces a year, but Smith reported that production could be increased dramatically, that the base cost per ounce could be lowered just as dramatically, and that he could run the mine much more efficiently."

Source:The Golden Phoenix : A Biography of Peter Munk

"On Smith's advice, Munk put in a bid. When it turned out to be close to but lower than Exxon’s, who came in at about $60 million, Munk withdrew. But then Exxon backed off and departed. Munk lowballed with a bid of US$31 million with a sweetener: Texaco would get half of any proceeds should gold go over US$385 an ounce, topping out at US$9 million. Texaco took Munk’s offer. The next step was to finance the deal. Munk’s recent feat of paying off the Royal’s $100-million Camflo debt gave him new credibility. The Continental Bank Company gave Munk an equity loan of US$31 million. With the funds already in hand, Barrick closed the Mercur deal in June 1985."

Source:The Golden Phoenix : A Biography of Peter Munk

"The major rescue operation was set to happen on Wednesday, February 21, six days after the first uneventful grounding. Now, they could not afford to fail. Therefore, they brought in all available rescue personnel, the ship's crew, and pollution experts. The large tugboat "Arild Viking" arrived at the site, and by 4:30 PM, the powerful Norwegian tug had twelve other tugboats with it. Two pilots were sent aboard to direct the attempt to get the "Sea Empress" off the ground. At 5:35 PM, the boat began to slowly turn, and after repeated attempts, the main engine onboard started. By 6 PM, the "Sea Empress" came off the ground, and well aided by the tremendous forces of "Arild Viking," the battered supertanker was moved to the middle of the channel. Finally, a controlled towing could be started up the channel, and after three hours the moorings could be fastened at the Texaco refinery on the north side of Milton Haven."

Source:Storeulv (translated)

"Sensibly, Fredriksen and Trøim had three offshore units that they had bought for around 85 million dollars just a few months earlier, which – except for the rig – were in lay-up. But prudence disappears like dew in the sun in good times, and both brokers and investors saw gold. According to Trøim, people were almost generous. The clever shipping man told the newspapers that they had received offers from anonymous American brokerage houses to bring in a total of 575 million dollars for the two drillships and the one rig in a public offering in the USA. Instead, they chose to accept a price tag of "only" 400 million dollars in Oslo, Trøim said. And both the press and the investors bit. Led by the court brokers Pareto Fonds and Fearnley Fonds, the shares in the newly started Northern Offshore ASA were put on the market. In one day, the shares were snapped up, more than 200 investors stood in line. That the emission in practice meant that the bellwether was selling, bothered no one significantly. Thus Fredriksen got rid of both drillships and production rig – and could pocket a profit of an incredible 240 million dollars on just a few months’ paperwork. Fredriksen celebrated the sale by guaranteeing that "Northern Producer" would have good rates for the first year. During that period, the rig was leased out on a lucrative charterparty to Texaco."

Source:Storeulv (translated)

Appears In Volumes