Watson

"We have let ourselves become enchanted by big data only because we exoticize technology. We’re impressed with small feats accomplished by computers alone, but we ignore big achievements from complementarity because the human contribution makes them less uncanny. Watson, Deep Blue, and ever-better machine learning algorithms are cool. But the most valuable companies in the future won’t ask what problems can be solved with computers alone. Instead, they’ll ask: how can computers help humans solve hard problems?"

"I was in New York for a board meeting and I met up with Siggi in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel to flush out what Watson’s ideas were. Joining us in the meeting was Watson’s chief executive Paul Bisaro. As they began to describe their vision for the company and the sector, I couldn’t help but smile at the irony of it. Paul and I had crossed swords before in the very public battle for the Croatian pharma company Pliva, where we had each fought with every trick we knew. He had won and I had lost. That was water under the bridge, and I explained the situation for each of the stakeholders in Actavis. Deutsche Bank was looking for no risk at all, while my Novator vehicle was willing to look at the big picture in terms of future value creation. Watson’s idea was to pay with cash and stock, and clearly that would not work for Deutsche, even if it could work for us. I needed to find a way to make this work for both the bank and Novator. As they say, the devil is in the detail."

"In Frankfurt, I agreed with Deutsche Bank that I would continue to explore the Watson opportunity and try to crystallise it into an offer that we could work with, based on our different motivations. The weeks rolled on and I sensed that the Americans at Watson were also trying to be opportunistic and buy Actavis on the cheap through the bank. I knew, however, that Deutsche Bank had a clear pain threshold, from which it could not budge. Its absolute minimum was €4 billion in cash – more than the Americans were offering. I needed to make sure that this would not turn into a game with no outcome. This was truly a unique chance for us all."

"On 26 September 2011, at a meeting with the Watson executives in my office, I extrapolated the numbers and hypothesised about what the stock price of a Watson–Actavis combination could be over one-, two- and three-year frameworks. It was a persuasive argument and the main players all now agree that this was the point at which we all set ourselves on a mission to finish it one way or another. As it turned out, I had other matters to think about. The meeting was abruptly cut short when Kristin called to say she was going into labour prematurely and needed help immediately. I ran straight out of the meeting, shouting at my PA to call an ambulance to my home, and drove myself home like a madman, fearful for Kristin and our unborn child. Mercifully, a few hours later Kristin successfully gave birth to our little girl in an emergency procedure. I, however, still had another deal to deliver."

"I would get very little out of a Watson transaction if it were all cash, so I saw an opportunity emerging in the form of a riskier contingent payment which would be paid entirely in Watson shares. I saw a potential trade between Deutsche Bank and myself in the method of payment. Once again, I would have to double up on risk in order to have a shot at the upside that my intuition was telling me was there to be had."

"At first, the Watson people were very enthusiastic, and then some fatigue crept in. I sensed that we were losing momentum and had a suspicion that they were looking at another company simultaneously, so I took measures to have a backup bidder on the side should they disappear. It was tricky to manage this, but it worked. I had to get people back to being laser-focused on this deal."