Entity Dossier
Company

Campeau Corp.

Strategic Concepts & Mechanics

Strategic PatternFlanking Around Entrenched GiantsIdentity & CultureLoyalty Bought with Friday PaychecksRelationship LeverageBoard Seats as Reconnaissance PostsCornerstone MoveSell the Company to Itself — Internal Reverse TakeoversCompetitive AdvantageClassified Stock as Control MultiplierCornerstone MoveFind the Key Man and Close Before CombatOperating PrincipleCash Business Preference from Bus RootsStrategic PatternConcentrated Diversity Over Grab-Bag PortfoliosSignature MoveWin Small, Consolidate, Then Leap GeometricallySignature MoveWallpaper-Roll Planning Then Relentless PressureCornerstone MoveBuy Cheap Shells, Strip and Reload the PortfolioOperating PrinciplePool-of-Light Negotiation TheaterRelationship LeveragePolitical Access Without Political OfficeSignature MoveDebt as Temporary Tool, Never Permanent FoundationCapital StrategyDividends as Upward Cash EscalatorSignature MoveChief of Staff Handles Architecture, Boss Handles VisionDecision FrameworkAcquire Capacity, Never Build in InflationSignature MovePocket the Stake, Play with Winnings OnlyCornerstone MoveHidden Value Asset PlaySignature MoveLiquidity as Strategic ShieldIdentity & CultureOwner’s Mentality Over Manager’s EgoStrategic PatternDiversification for Cycle ResilienceCornerstone MoveBuy Low, Fix Fast, Exit SlowDecision FrameworkActivist Investor When NeededSignature MoveQuestion-Driven DisciplineStrategic PatternContrarian Patience in Asset MarketsOperating PrincipleSpeed Beats OverplanningRisk DoctrineEthics-First Boardroom InterventionsCornerstone MoveStructural Tax Advantage EngineeringSignature MoveManagement Autonomy, Command When NeededSignature MoveConviction Without CompromiseOperating PrincipleFree Cash Flow as Decision Lens

Primary Evidence

"Under the terms of the merger, all of Power’s realty assets — Canadian Interurban Realty, Blue Bonnets Raceway, Show Mart and Trans-Canada Realty, which included 22 shopping centres in Canada — were exchanged with Campeau for shares in Campeau Corporation. Other shares were purchased from Campeau Corporation, and another block bought on the open market, to give Power 48.6 percent of the equity and 52.3 percent of the voting shares in Campeau. The deal was definitely a Power deal, because the terms gave control of Campeau Corp. to Power. This led to difficulties in both companies’ executive suites."

Source:Rising to Power - Paul Desmarais & Power Corporation

"Tisch’s winning investments had more to do with day-to-day man- agement of finances and operations than with economic foresight. In 1979, Tisch was asked what he would buy to hold for 20 years. Four' teen years later, many of his picks would look like dogs. For example, he liked savings-and-loan associations, which turned out to be one of the most prominent national economic disasters of the early 1990s, because of high-risk lending and investing. Federated Department Stores, another Tisch pick, would get gobbled up by a reckless Campeau Corp. in the late 1980s, only to be plunged into bankruptcy by too much debt. He liked Tosco, wrongly betting that its oil shale business would boom because of problems with the traditional sources of oil. Savin Business Machines would end up in bankruptcy court in 1992, Studebaker-Worthington Inc. would be bought out later that year by McGraw-Edison Co., and Northwest Industries was the sub- ject of a crippling, debt-laden buyout in the mid-1980s. But Tisch wasn’t one to make bets himself on the basis of a 20-year forecast. “We’re pragmatic,” he said. “Our philosophy could change from one day to the next.”"

Source:The King of Cash: The Inside Story of Laurence Tisch

Appears In Volumes