EU

"During the 1980s and up to the purchase by Gad, Tetra Pak had acquired a market-leading position, especially for aseptic packaging systems. However, this dominant position began to be questioned by competitors as well as within the EU. In 1983, the Norwegian competitor Elopak, with its Pure-Pak packaging, accused Tetra Pak of abusing its dominant position. During the legal process that followed, the EU also began questioning the highly successful and ingenious business model that Tetra Pak had used from the start. The model was based on selling or leasing the packaging machines and primarily making money by selling packaging materials to dairies. Tetra Pak also attached a service agreement to the packaging machines, committing to solve any operational problems at short notice, as well as handle maintenance, deliver spare parts, and train the staff. However, the service agreement was valid only if the dairy used Tetra Pak’s paper materials. The terms of the agreement could vary somewhat from country to country. What Elopak objected to was not Tetra Pak’s business model but their practice of “dumping” the price of paper materials for pasteurized packaging."

"Alongside his visions, Ruben had a very clear analytical ability in socio-economic issues in some respects. He was an active writer and took a prominent place in public debate. He expressed his opinions on a variety of issues such as the emergence of the EEC/EU, tax policy, planned economy versus market economy, and communication issues. But, which was typical of his disposition, he also debated issues that should preferably have been avoided."

"Tetra Pak had long lived on being both the price leader and technologically superior, where they protected their technology through various patents. Even when the patents expired, it took a while before competitors had developed the knowledge to copy the Tetra systems, especially the aseptic packaging. With the help of various additional patents, Tetra Pak’s Aseptic Tetra Brik system protected its technology from being copied by others. However, these patent protections began to expire in the early 2000s. Strengthened by the EU ruling against Tetra Pak, the Swiss company SIG Combibloc had started a more aggressive strategy at the turn of the millennium to compete with Tetra Pak’s aseptic systems and packaging. There were also other competitors within aseptics who began to challenge Tetra Pak’s leading position."

""The government and other politicians accuse corporate leaders of threats, but they must realize that with the EU, we are in a new competition situation. Naturally, companies choose the most attractive areas. It's up to the politicians to ensure they create attractive opportunities for investors and entrepreneurs," says Stefan Persson."

"After the collapse of Northern Rock in August 2007 and subsequent concerns about other UK-based banks, what I had seen as a secure deposit base and a strength began to weaken. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers a year later, UK investors began a general run on bank deposits which was to pose jurisdictional questions in previously uncharted waters. Icesave became a problem because its UK deposits were held by a UK branch of Landsbanki, rather than by Heritable, which was a British bank wholly owned by Landsbanki. In hindsight, this was a major mistake by the management. I have to admit that, right up to the weekend of the collapse, I was unaware of such technicalities. It only started to dawn on me that this could be a difficulty when I spoke to the prime minister on 2 October. I can see it clearly now. Iceland is not a member of the EU, but an Icelandic bank had opened a branch in the UK, under EU regulation, and accepted deposits. So there was a jurisdictional issue – an issue that came to the fore over the weekend of 4–5 October 2008, as Iceland’s financial crisis unfolded."

"The main strand of the claim that made up this issue was that an enormous sum invested by UK and Dutch savers would now have to be paid back by the Icelandic taxpayer. It was an incendiary idea, which, by virtue of being repeated, became an accepted truth. In fact, for the Icelandic taxpayer to have to foot the bill, Landsbanki’s assets would have had to have been worthless or to have fallen at least 50 per cent. Neither was ever the case. Landsbanki did not go bankrupt because it had lost its assets. It had simply not been able to change Icelandic krona for foreign currency. It was a liquidity crisis, rather than any fraud or malfeasance, that forced it to stop. Furthermore, no one had previously suggested that the Icelandic state was responsible for debts of a commercial enterprise, so it was extraordinary to do so now. The problem was some ambiguity over the responsibilities in such situations of EFTA countries (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland) vis-à-vis EU member states."