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McKinsey

Strategic Concepts & Mechanics

Signature MoveOblique Messaging for Direct Truths
Cornerstone MoveFlip the Frame Before Solving the Problem
Signature MoveClever and Lazy Beats Clever and Busy
Competitive AdvantageBrands as Non-Shitness Guarantees
Operating PrincipleSerendipity as Engineerable Asset
Signature MoveKill Anxiety Before Building Preference
Signature MoveSatisficing Over Maximising as Default Lens
Strategic PatternSocial Embarrassment as Purchase Governor
Cornerstone MoveFind the Missing Third That Logic Won't Tell You
Signature MoveTransaction Cost as Hidden Competitor
Competitive AdvantageOverheard Signal Beats Direct Message
Decision FrameworkPath Dependency Precedes Brand Choice
Cornerstone MoveSteal From Adjacent Fields, Not Your Own
Risk DoctrineNaked Greed Destroys Brand Value
Strategic PatternSmall Can Charges More Than Big Can
Identity & CultureIdeals Outlive Strategies
Operating PrincipleSelf-Manufactured Belief Compounds Over Time
Implementation TacticOlympian Expectations Escalate or Die
Competitive AdvantageThe Proprietary Segment of One
Implementation TacticThe Reality Distortion Field as Leadership Tool
Strategic ManeuverRide the Pool Vehicle, Then Build Your Own
Mental ModelPositioning Beats Performance Every Time
Strategic ManeuverNarrow the Niche Until You're the Only One
Mental ModelAnti-Fragile Spirit: Setbacks as Discovery Mechanism
Mental ModelOne Breakthrough Achievement, Not a Portfolio
Strategic ManeuverThe Personal Vehicle as Force Multiplier
Mental ModelBe Profitably Different, Not Just Different
Strategic ManeuverGet Transformed on Someone Else's Dime
Strategic PatternBain's Exclusivity-Intimacy Flywheel
Decision FrameworkGap in the Market Plus Market in the Gap
Relationship LeverageMentors by Adoption, Not Permission
Strategic ManeuverDesire Deeply, Wait, Pounce
Identity & CultureSerious Intent as Daily Obsession
Operating PrinciplePersonality Reinvention Through Displacement
Mental ModelIntuition as Articulated Hidden Knowledge
Capital StrategyExpected Value Betting at Long Odds
Cornerstone MoveEquity Stakes for Distribution Leverage
Competitive AdvantageCableLabs Royalty-Free Standards Play
Cornerstone MoveStock Architecture to Lock Control
Competitive AdvantageBlackout as Franchise Leverage
Capital StrategyTax-Sheltered Growing Annuity
Capital StrategyInsurance Company Capital Over Banks
Signature MoveNever Bet the Whole Farm
Strategic PatternWarrants as Industry Coordination Currency
Decision FrameworkEmpathy as Negotiation Architecture
Signature MoveThrow the Keys on the Table
Signature MoveOwn a Small Piece of a Winner You Can't Run
Operating PrincipleDecentralized Cowboys with Centralized Benchmarks
Risk DoctrineWhat If Not as Decision Filter
Strategic PatternScale Economics as Survival Doctrine
Signature MoveAsk One Sharp Question to Crack Open Intel
Signature MoveCash Flow Not Earnings as Currency
Cornerstone MoveBuy the System, Pay With Its Own Cash Flow
Identity & CultureIntrovert's Edge Through Listening
Signature MoveCautious Capital Doubling—Then Partial Exit
Operating PrincipleAbstinence From Unsustainable Leverage
Competitive AdvantageInvestor Credibility Conversion
Relationship LeverageElite Club Networking as Capital Magnet
Risk DoctrineFront Companies as Risk Shields
Identity & CultureEntrepreneur-Backer Symbiosis
Signature MovePersonal Involvement With Entrepreneurial Mavericks
Signature MoveBoardroom Early Warning System
Cornerstone MoveNetwork Leverage Into High-Growth Deals
Signature MoveHands-On Club Deals Over Outsider Bids
Operating PrincipleHands-On Crisis Engagement
Cornerstone MoveRisk-Reward Arbitrage via Exit Clauses

Primary Evidence

"Let’s look at a few other surprises. How many McKinseyites routinely go to flea-markets or car-boot sales? Very few, I think it’s fair to assert. And yet the employees of large consulting firms are massive users of eBay. Once again, the medium is the product."

Source:Rory Sutherland

"When I was thirty-three, and my vehicle hove into view in the shape of LEK, I asked myself whether I was ready to become co-founder of a serious global firm – that was what we intended – to rival the giants of BCG, Bain and McKinsey. I pondered the question, and eventually decided I was ready, because: •  I really understood the concepts of strategy consulting and how to sell it. •  I could see a gap in the market for our first phase of success – we could build a British-based firm able to package and sell ‘American’ concepts in user-friendly ways to British and European bosses. •  Not only was there a gap in the market, but there was also a market in the gap – a big target market which was under-served. We could see something that our top competitors couldn’t: that the decision-makers in British and European companies were often put off by American ‘power salesmanship’ and jargon, by a lack of intellectual subtlety, and a failure to understand local nuances. We aimed to capitalise on that. •  Although we were a new outfit, LEK had partners who had worked for two of our top rival firms at a senior level, and we reckoned we would be at least the peers of the consultants we would be selling against. •  We were really excited about being in business for ourselves, taking whatever risks we wanted to, choosing who would work in our venture and reaping the rewards for ourselves and our people. •  We were confident about the economics of our new business if we could sell large chunks of business. We knew that strategy consulting was highly profitable, that it required no capital investment, and that it could be cash-positive very quickly."

Source:Unreasonable Success and How to Achieve It

"By 1970, two years after joining the firm, I knew I had to move. One of my last clients at McKinsey connected me to was someone who would change my thinking forever. A company called General Instrument had started as a sleepy electronics firm in New York in 1923 and had evolved into being the owner of assorted electronics businesses. GI had just bought a Philadelphia-based company called Jerrold Electronics; it was a massive acquisition for a company that size, roughly 40 percent of its value at the time."

Source:Born to Be Wired

"I relied on creative problem-solving skills I had honed at Jerrold and in my days at Bell Labs and McKinsey. Some days I felt energized by the challenge, like a young mechanic back home piecing together parts on the garage floor and trying to get a dead engine to come sputtering back to life."

Source:Born to Be Wired

"Benko started as a start-up entrepreneur and simply remained one, even as the company branched out and grew in width and height. Other start-up entrepreneurs eventually bring in experienced managers to reorganize the company – like Google's bosses did with Eric Schmidt, who had previously led traditional IT companies, or Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg with manager Sheryl Sandberg, who had stints at McKinsey and Google."

Source:Benko's castle in the sky (translated)

Appears In Volumes