SEC

"Most of all there would be the crafting of the document around which the entire transaction would pivot: Pixar’s prospectus. This mind-numbingly detailed legal document would be filed with the SEC and then delivered to every potential investor. The prospectus would disclose in painstaking detail every facet of Pixar’s business, qualitatively and quantitatively, and would contain page after page of discussion of the risks that every investor should know about. It would describe Pixar’s history, vision, business plan, technology, animation and production processes, competition, risks, executives, board members, stock ownership, stock option plan, and countless other details relevant to understanding the company. It would be as long as a book and take many weeks and many nights in a room full of investment bankers and lawyers to craft its every word. After that, it would be subject to the comments of the SEC to which we would have to respond in detail. If anyone along the way—investment bankers, lawyers, accountants, or the SEC—was not happy with that prospectus, there would be no public offering."

"As though to underline this desire for structural egalitarianism, Milken had no office. On the infrequent occasions when he was away from his desk in the center of the trading floor, he urged others to use it. Meetings were generally open to all who were interested. People were encouraged to perform numerous functions. In a later SEC deposition, given in 1982, Milken described some people in his group as “quasi-trader salesmen,” explaining that “on a given day he could be primarily selling, and another day he could be trading. Another day he could be doing something else.”"

"As though to underline this desire for structural egalitarianism, Milken had no office. On the infrequent occasions when he was away from his desk in the center of the trading floor, he urged others to use it. Meetings were generally open to all who were interested. People were encouraged to perform numerous functions. In a later SEC deposition, given in 1982, Milken described some people in his group as “quasi-trader salesmen,” explaining that “on a given day he could be primarily selling, and another day he could be trading. Another day he could be doing something else.”"

"They told Charlie that, and he said, “I’m not going to be threatened by anyone; he’s a common thief and ought to be prosecuted.” The district attorney had an easy case: Dolkart had stolen nearly $3 million, absolute clean thievery, with no extenuating circumstances. However, Dolkart did indeed go after Charlie, saying that he had committed various crimes of self-aggrandizement and SEC filing errors. Dolkart ended up becoming a government witness, never served a day in jail, and never paid back the stolen money. And Charlie went through five years of absolute, and absolutely undeserved, hell as a result."

"When Frontline bought Independent Tankers in May 1998, with ten tankers, from Bjørn Q. Aaserød, they acquired as much debt as steel. Quite precise, actually. The leverage was so high that Fredriksen gained control of the ten ships for only 9.5 million dollars in equity, while the value of all assets in ITC was one billion dollars. The problem for Frontline was that the debt ratio in the shipping company would become dangerously high if the fleet was taken into the balance sheet. With the miserable shipping market at the time, it could lead to problems with banks and loan agreements. A month later, the fleet is sold on to Fredriksen personally, through Hemen Holding, for the same price. In the report to the SEC for 1999, it states that Frontline got a five-year option to buy back the fleet. But Frontline does not use the option, instead, it is extended, and in the report submitted to the SEC in July 2005, it states that on July 1, 2003, Frontline bought an option from Hemen Holding to take over the Independent fleet. The price of the option and the shares was 14 million dollars, which Frontline utilized the following year."