Supplier Credit as Venture Capital

“One of the company’s largest expenses was paper purchases. Ruben decided that no invoice from the paper mills would be paid within the stipulated 30 days. Instead, the supplier credit would be extended as far as possible. But there were no negotiations with the paper mills, especially involving Billerud and Uddeholm, but entirely a unilateral decision on Ruben’s part. After he had decided how the financing would be managed, he drove the line to absurdum. Payment times would, entirely in accordance with Ruben’s tactics, sometimes amount to eleven months. Holger, who was a much more sensitive person than Ruben, found the situation uncomfortable and wanted Ruben to change his mind. Invoices should be paid on time, was Holger’s firm belief. But he gained no listening at all from Ruben. “It’s only natural that they contribute to the payment, since we’re increasing their market. They haven’t been very good at that themselves,” claimed Ruben. Ruben’s reasoning was correct to the extent that the conservative Swedish paper companies were terrible at creating new markets themselves. It was also entirely correct that Tetra Pak gave the paper mills a huge sales boost. But despite everything, it is customary to negotiate supplier credits. That’s what the paper mills believed, too. However, Ruben was not at all ashamed that Tetra Pak did not pay a single invoice on time. Instead, he only said the same thing to them as he said to Holger. “You are obliged to help with our financing since we are expanding your markets.” When the paper mills’ managers found no understanding from Ruben, they instead turned to Holger who suffered and was ashamed. “You must understand that I can’t do anything. Ruben has decided that this is how it should be, and I can’t influence him,” Holger was forced to say. The paper mills were caught in a catch-22. Even though they wanted to get their money, they knew they couldn’t push Tetra into bankruptcy. Then there would be no money at all, as the company had virtually no assets. Another important creditor was the construction company ABV, which voluntarily gave very long credits to Tetra Pak’s new factory facilities. The rapidly growing business required almost constant construction of new premises. Without ABV’s willingness to extend credit, it probably wouldn’t have been possible for Tetra Pak to expand as quickly as it did. But it wasn’t just loans and credits that financed the development of Brik. Since the aseptic package hit the market, fantastic sales successes were noted. Mainly, the system was sold in developing countries – exactly as planned. In a short period, the company brought in – for that time – enormous sums. But the expansion also cost.”

“When 1955 was over, Tetra Pak’s balance sheet total – the sum of debts and equity – amounted to 6,038,382 kronor, of which 6,027,611 kronor were debts. The turnover was at 6,336,633. In the heavily manicured annual report, an operating profit of 48,579 kronor was recorded. In reality, it was about a loss of one million kronor. But the loss was dribbled away by allocating certain expenses to Åkerlund & Rausing’s annual report. The costs for machine development were borne by Östanå, a paper mill that Ruben and Holger had bought during the Second World War. It was only in the closed rooms of Tetra Pak and Åkerlund & Rausing that the real figures could be discussed. This way, they avoided having anxious creditors running in the corridors. And anxious they would have become if they realized the company’s escalating costs.”