Entity Dossier
Company

Technicolor

Strategic Concepts & Mechanics

Strategic PatternProcess of Bites, Not Grand PlansDecision FrameworkCash Flow Over Earnings as Debt Survival TestRelationship LeverageHighly Confident as Substitute for Actual CapitalCapital StrategyInterest Deductibility as Leveraged Assault FuelCompetitive AdvantageNOL as Bidding War Nuclear OptionSignature MoveSpeed-of-Sale as Debt Survival DoctrineSignature MoveLawyer as Deal Principal, Not Hired GunSignature MoveParis Apartment DisciplineSignature MoveAll Debt Disguised as EquityCornerstone MoveBuy the Whole, Sell Everything But the Crown JewelCornerstone MoveBlind Pool Before the Target ExistsCornerstone MoveBribe the Gatekeeper, Storm the CastleCornerstone MoveBankruptcy's Tax Corpse as Acquisition WeaponCompetitive AdvantageTax Arbitrage as Structural WeaponOperating PrincipleProfessional Manager Decay Across GenerationsRisk DoctrineNever Cut Back a Committed DealSignature MoveMilken: Four-Thirty AM Cathedral-Builder With No OfficeCapital StrategyVenture Capital Masquerading as DebtSignature MovePeltz: Spittle-on-the-Check Persistence from Near-BrokeSignature MovePerelman: Borrowed $1.9M to a Boeing 727 in Seven YearsCornerstone MoveManufactured Credibility from Thin AirDecision FrameworkContra-Thinking as Default Mental Operating SystemIdentity & CultureForced Savings as Loyalty HandcuffsCornerstone MoveCash Flow Over Earnings as the Only TruthCornerstone MoveBuy the Core, Sell the Pieces, Erase the DebtSignature MoveKingsley: Mount Everest Desk, Twenty-Year Sounding BoardSignature MoveIcahn: Wrestling-a-Ghost Negotiation Until the Last PennyCornerstone MoveOwner's Equity as the Non-Negotiable Discipline

Primary Evidence

"Perelman’s plan, at least at the start, was to do here what he had done on a much smaller scale in his earlier acquisitions, with Technicolor perhaps the best example: acquire the company with virtually all debt and then sell off the pieces he didn’t want, using the proceeds from their sales to pay down the debt and getting the remaining business virtually for free. Perelman made this plan explicit in his tender-offer document, stating that Pantry Pride believed it might be able to realize up to $ 1.9 billion—the total of his offer, at the starting $ 47.50 per-share price—from the sale of substantially all the assets of Revlon, excepting the beauty business. And it was, obviously, necessary to firm up these divestiture prices as much as possible, for Perelman—and, more to the point, Drexel—to know just how much they could afford to bid."

Source:The Predators' Ball

"“Even though Forbes magazine would have us believe otherwise, Mr. Perelman, who runs Pantry Pride today, seems to have had the ability of knowing what to do with his money. . . . In the last six to seven years, not only has he taken a few million dollars and purchased MacAndrews and Forbes, and then bought Wilbur Chocolates, and then took the company private, and then bought Consolidated Cigar, and then bought Technicolor, but [he] has subsequently invested money in Pantry Pride. . . . Pantry Pride was only selling at three and three quarters before Mr. Perelman took it over, and is now selling somewhere between eleven and twelve—in a matter of less than one year. Why? Because a management team has been brought to bear, which was willing to take the risk, who had the vision of value, and to find the backing of you in this room and other institutional investors around the country, willing to loan them money with the understanding that they had to commit to repay your interest and principal, and have the vision or foresight, which was the scarce resource, to identify those assets that are undervalued in the marketplace, the difference between a perception and the reality, and to use your money wisely. ."

Source:The Predators' Ball

"“Even though Forbes magazine would have us believe otherwise, Mr. Perelman, who runs Pantry Pride today, seems to have had the ability of knowing what to do with his money. . . . In the last six to seven years, not only has he taken a few million dollars and purchased MacAndrews and Forbes, and then bought Wilbur Chocolates, and then took the company private, and then bought Consolidated Cigar, and then bought Technicolor, but [he] has subsequently invested money in Pantry Pride. . . . Pantry Pride was only selling at three and three quarters before Mr. Perelman took it over, and is now selling somewhere between eleven and twelve—in a matter of less than one year. Why? Because a management team has been brought to bear, which was willing to take the risk, who had the vision of value, and to find the backing of you in this room and other institutional investors around the country, willing to loan them money with the understanding that they had to commit to repay your interest and principal, and have the vision or foresight, which was the scarce resource, to identify those assets that are undervalued in the marketplace, the difference between a perception and the reality, and to use your money wisely. . . ."

Source:Predator's Ball

"Perelman’s plan, at least at the start, was to do here what he had done on a much smaller scale in his earlier acquisitions, with Technicolor perhaps the best example: acquire the company with virtually all debt and then sell off the pieces he didn’t want, using the proceeds from their sales to pay down the debt and getting the remaining business virtually for free. Perelman made this plan explicit in his tender-offer document, stating that Pantry Pride believed it might be able to realize up to $1.9 billion—the total of his offer, at the starting $47.50 per-share price—from the sale of substantially all the assets of Revlon, excepting the beauty business. And it was, obviously, necessary to firm up these divestiture prices as much as possible, for Perelman—and, more to the point, Drexel—to know just how much they could afford to bid."

Source:Predator's Ball

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