Manufacturers Hanover

"In April 1983, Peltz and May (in a two-thirds/ one-third partnership) purchased Goldberg’s block, 29 percent of Triangle’s shares, for about $ 14 million. Two million was lent to Trafalgar; twelve million was lent to Peltz and May, from Manufacturers Hanover and Bankers Trust. Bankers Trust took the stock as collateral; Manufacturers Hanover took Peltz’s and May’s signatures and a lien on Peltz’s house in Quogue. Peltz recalled that it took all his powers of persuasion at the bank, and that when he finally walked out of Bill Rykman’s office at Manufacturers Hanover with the certified check in hand and met Goldberg, Goldberg told him that he couldn’t do the deal after all, because the Triangle board would not approve the change of control. “I literally ran the check under his nose, the spittle started to come out of his mouth, he was dying to put his arms around the money,” Peltz declared. “I said, ‘Let me try, let me talk to the board, let me show them I don’t have horns.’"

"In April 1983, Peltz and May (in a two-thirds/one-third partnership) purchased Goldberg’s block, 29 percent of Triangle’s shares, for about $14 million. Two million was lent to Trafalgar; twelve million was lent to Peltz and May, from Manufacturers Hanover and Bankers Trust. Bankers Trust took the stock as collateral; Manufacturers Hanover took Peltz’s and May’s signatures and a lien on Peltz’s house in Quogue. Peltz recalled that it took all his powers of persuasion at the bank, and that when he finally walked out of Bill Rykman’s office at Manufacturers Hanover with the certified check in hand and met Goldberg, Goldberg told him that he couldn’t do the deal after all, because the Triangle board would not approve the change of control. “I literally ran the check under his nose, the spittle started to come out of his mouth, he was dying to put his arms around the money,” Peltz declared. “I said, ‘Let me try, let me talk to the board, let me show them I don’t have horns.’ ”"

"I also told the governor that we should instruct the New York bank superintendent to keep one bank open beyond the normal 3 P.M. closing time. My thought was that if Shanker waited until the last minute to agree, we’d need to have a bank ready to receive the funds. After a conversation with Carey, the state bank superintendent, John Heimann, instructed Manufacturers Hanover to remain open until midnight. To make sure that this “after hours” strategy was actually practical, I called Judge Rifkind and asked for a legal opinion. Did New York have until midnight to pay off its notes rather than the usual bank closing time at 3 P.M.? Rifkind, to my great satisfaction, concurred that default for nonpayment would not occur until the end of the entire day."