Entity Dossier
Company

Salomon Brothers

Strategic Concepts & Mechanics

Signature MoveThiel's Threat-Detection Before Anyone Else Sees ItSignature MoveBotha's Actuarial Perfectionism Under FireSignature MoveLevchin's Pattern-Mathematics Over Human JudgmentStrategic PatternAdjacent Conquest Over Revolutionary LeapCornerstone MoveHire Outsiders, Ban the ExperiencedCapital StrategyContrarian Timing: IPO When Nobody WillCornerstone MoveWinner-Take-All Speed Over PerfectionSignature MoveHoffman's Pithy Kill-Shot ReframeOperating PrincipleCandor as User Retention WeaponIdentity & CulturePrehistoric Trust as Speed MultiplierCornerstone MoveFraud Dial vs. Usability Dial: Tension as ArchitectureStrategic PatternNegotiate to Silence, Not to SellSignature MoveMusk's Grand-Prize Framing to Bend RealityCornerstone MoveEmbed in the Host, Then Become the HostCompetitive AdvantageButtons as Strategic MoatIdentity & CultureProducer Not Manager: Title Shapes BehaviorIdentity & CultureMortal Enemy as Team AdhesiveSignature MoveDr. No: Kill Every Feature That Isn't the StrategyStrategic PatternProcess of Bites, Not Grand PlansDecision FrameworkCash Flow Over Earnings as Debt Survival TestRelationship LeverageHighly Confident as Substitute for Actual CapitalCapital StrategyInterest Deductibility as Leveraged Assault FuelCompetitive AdvantageNOL as Bidding War Nuclear OptionSignature MoveSpeed-of-Sale as Debt Survival DoctrineSignature MoveLawyer as Deal Principal, Not Hired GunSignature MoveParis Apartment DisciplineSignature MoveAll Debt Disguised as EquityCornerstone MoveBuy the Whole, Sell Everything But the Crown JewelCornerstone MoveBlind Pool Before the Target ExistsCornerstone MoveBribe the Gatekeeper, Storm the CastleCornerstone MoveBankruptcy's Tax Corpse as Acquisition WeaponCompetitive AdvantageTax Arbitrage as Structural WeaponOperating PrincipleProfessional Manager Decay Across GenerationsRisk DoctrineNever Cut Back a Committed DealSignature MoveMilken: Four-Thirty AM Cathedral-Builder With No OfficeCapital StrategyVenture Capital Masquerading as DebtSignature MovePeltz: Spittle-on-the-Check Persistence from Near-BrokeSignature MovePerelman: Borrowed $1.9M to a Boeing 727 in Seven YearsCornerstone MoveManufactured Credibility from Thin AirDecision FrameworkContra-Thinking as Default Mental Operating SystemIdentity & CultureForced Savings as Loyalty HandcuffsCornerstone MoveCash Flow Over Earnings as the Only TruthCornerstone MoveBuy the Core, Sell the Pieces, Erase the DebtSignature MoveKingsley: Mount Everest Desk, Twenty-Year Sounding BoardSignature MoveIcahn: Wrestling-a-Ghost Negotiation Until the Last PennyCornerstone MoveOwner's Equity as the Non-Negotiable DisciplineCornerstone MoveOutsider Aggression as Market EntryCornerstone MoveTake the Pay Cut, Take the Risk, Take the FloorSignature MoveSell Too Early, Never Go BrokeSignature MoveConviction Without CompromiseCapital StrategyBonuses Locked as Skin in the GameStrategic PatternSchumpeter's Prophecy as Battle CrySignature MoveAll Capital Locked Inside the ShipRisk DoctrineInflation Punishes the Poor FirstIdentity & CultureAthens Warning for Comfortable DemocraciesSignature MoveInstill Faith Others Can't See in ThemselvesOperating PrincipleControls as Volcanic PressureCornerstone MoveHidden Value Asset PlaySignature MoveLiquidity as Strategic ShieldIdentity & CultureOwner’s Mentality Over Manager’s EgoStrategic PatternDiversification for Cycle ResilienceCornerstone MoveBuy Low, Fix Fast, Exit SlowDecision FrameworkActivist Investor When NeededSignature MoveQuestion-Driven DisciplineStrategic PatternContrarian Patience in Asset MarketsOperating PrincipleSpeed Beats OverplanningRisk DoctrineEthics-First Boardroom InterventionsCornerstone MoveStructural Tax Advantage EngineeringSignature MoveManagement Autonomy, Command When NeededOperating PrincipleFree Cash Flow as Decision Lens

Primary Evidence

"“When I was in my upper twenties, the managing partner of O’Connor said, ‘David, we want to make you the global head of the fixed income and derivatives division of the bank,’ ” Solo recalled. “And I remember saying, ‘... that’s great, but don’t you think you’d be better off hiring somebody from Salomon Brothers who actually knows all this stuff?’ And [he] said, ‘You know what, we might actually lose nine months or a year by not hiring the guy who has more experience, but in the end, we’ve always succeeded by betting on the people who we think have the talent and work ethic—and who we know.’"

Source:The Founders

"At that 1982 session, Joseph and the others drew up a list of the people who were the stars of the M& A world. It included Martin Siegel of Kidder, Peabody; Eric Gleacher of Lehman Brothers; Bruce Wasserstein of First Boston; Felix Rohatyn of Lazard Frères; Ira Harris of Salomon Brothers—and lawyers too, like Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and Katz, and Joe Flom of Skadden, Arps, Meagher, Slate and Flom."

Source:The Predators' Ball

"What Drexel had done was to securitize the low-grade corporate loan, much as Salomon Brothers had securitized mortgages in its creation of the mortgage-backed security."

Source:The Predators' Ball

"At that 1982 session, Joseph and the others drew up a list of the people who were the stars of the M&A world. It included Martin Siegel of Kidder, Peabody; Eric Gleacher of Lehman Brothers; Bruce Wasserstein of First Boston; Felix Rohatyn of Lazard Frères; Ira Harris of Salomon Brothers—and lawyers too, like Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and Katz, and Joe Flom of Skadden, Arps, Meagher, Slate and Flom."

Source:Predator's Ball

"What Drexel had done was to securitize the low-grade corporate loan, much as Salomon Brothers had securitized mortgages in its creation of the mortgage-backed security."

Source:Predator's Ball

"“When I was in my upper twenties, the managing partner of O’Connor said, ‘David, we want to make you the global head of the fixed income and derivatives division of the bank,’ ” Solo recalled. “And I remember saying, ‘… that’s great, but don’t you think you’d be better off hiring somebody from Salomon Brothers who actually knows all this stuff?’ And [he] said, ‘You know what, we might actually lose nine months or a year by not hiring the guy who has more experience, but in the end, we’ve always succeeded by betting on the people who we think have the talent and work ethic—and who we know.’ ”"

Source:The Founders

"No one could understand why anyone in his right mind would give up a $125,000-a-year job at a comfortable and respected firm like Weeden to take a $50,000 position—with the promise of “consideration of partnership,” but no guarantees—at a house like Salomon Brothers, a big leaguer in general but a minor player in my specialty, municipal bonds. But then, some people just don’t understand risk."

Source:A Time for Reflection

"Our futures, as well as the success of the firm, were intertwined. Billy Salomon had wisely structured a unique compensation system. Salaries were actually quite low,4 but at the end of the year Salomon Brothers would distribute bonuses, based on how the firm as a whole had performed. However, we could draw only 5 percent of our capital, which meant the bonus money was invested with the firm. Consequently, the fate of the partners was directly linked to the success of Salomon Brothers, which fostered a clannish connection within that boiling cauldron of activity. It was understood that apart from our homes, insurance policies, and bank accounts, we didn’t have interests separate from the firm’s and we didn’t make investments outside the firm. All for one, one for all."

Source:A Time for Reflection

"At NYU’s School of Commerce, Larry Tisch met and studied under the legendary Marcus Nadler, whose ideas about the international money markets and the role of central banks would later influence Tisch and a group of devoted followers. Perhaps the most famous member of the group was investor Henry Kaufman, who spent 26 years at Salomon Brothers. “Nadler had an extraordinary ability to simplify complex financial practices,” said Kaufman, who studied under Nadler several years after Tisch. “He did not have a pet theory, but he was an anti-inflationist.” Perhaps Nadler’s greatest quality was his step-by-step approach to problem solving, a hallmark of Tisch’s future business strategy. Nadler developed an enormous following of former students. His classes on current economic and financial problems frequently were attended by former students, many of whom joined the Money Marke- teers, a group that met several times a year for dinner and to hear Nadler speak. Nadler was a major influence in formulating Tisch’s views on money supply fluctuations and the implications for inflation, interest rates, and the economy."

Source:The King of Cash: The Inside Story of Laurence Tisch

Appears In Volumes