Entity Dossier
Organization

Palm

Strategic Concepts & Mechanics

Strategic PatternKnowledge as Accessible SuperpowerSignature MoveLook Up and Around, Not Just DownCompetitive AdvantageSimple Reason to Exist WinsRisk DoctrinePassion Beats Timing If PersistentSignature MoveHands Dirty in Every DetailOperating PrincipleCuriosity-First Career NavigationSignature MovePersistent Generosity to Build ConnectionsRelationship LeverageMentors Reframe, Never Hand AnswersSignature MoveChase Scarred Masters, Not Titles or PerksDecision FrameworkCEO Eyes on the Horizon, Hands in the FireCornerstone MoveSolve the Problem You Personally Feel FirstCornerstone MoveDo, Fail, Learn — Then Do It Again DifferentlyCornerstone MoveInfiltrate the C-Suite, Bypass the IT DepartmentSignature MoveStock Price Talk Gets You Donut DutyCornerstone MoveSleeper Apps Smuggled Past Carrier GatekeepersDecision FrameworkConlee Vacuum and Decision DriftSignature MoveTuesday Noon Grilling Then Tuesday Afternoon ExplosionIdentity & CultureDual Loyalty Hires as Organizational WedgeStrategic PatternAmbiguity as Competitive WeaponCornerstone MoveTrojan Horse Licensing to Neutralize RivalsRisk DoctrineCarrier Fee Dependency as Fragile MoatOperating PrincipleRemove Think Points Until InvisibleSignature MoveThree Times Before It's an OrderSignature MoveMeetings as Scripted Corporate TheaterSignature MoveThirteen-Hour Meeting as Onboarding RitualRelationship LeverageFoxconn's Loss-Leader-to-Lock-In PlaybookRisk DoctrineTacit Knowledge as Accidental ExportCompetitive AdvantageApple Squeeze: Invaluable Experience Over MarginIdentity & CultureVerbal Jujitsu Procurement CultureSignature MoveDesign the Impossible Then Manufacture the ImpossibleSignature MoveFifty Business Class Seats Daily to ShenzhenOperating PrincipleZero Inventory as Theological DoctrineStrategic PatternUnconstrained Design Not Cost ArbitrageCornerstone MoveSecret $275 Billion Kowtow to Keep the Machine RunningSignature MoveSilk Tie Competitions to Train NegotiatorsCornerstone MoveScrew It, iTunes for WindowsCornerstone MoveBuy the Machines, Own the Factory Floor Without Owning a FactorySignature MoveDrive Off the Cliff to Prove the Brakes Don't WorkCornerstone MoveTrain Everyone Then Pit Them Against Each OtherRisk DoctrineRule By Law as Corporate LeashDecision FrameworkBig Potato Small Potato: Positional Power Over Fairness

Primary Evidence

"And you know what utterly beat us? Palm. Because Palm PDAs let you put the phone numbers you kept on scraps of paper or on your desktop computer into a device that you could carry with you. That’s it. That simple. You couldn’t jam a Rolodex into your pocket or purse, so Palm was the right solution for the time. It made sense. It had a reason to exist."

Source:Build

"There was a bigger game under way. Though they flattered Yankowski with attention, RIM’s partners had no interest in selling their company. They took Yankowski’s calls, showed up for meetings, and swapped boasts to keep him off guard. “Most people’s instincts tell them to seek clarity in business dealings, but ambiguity is more powerful in my view,” Balsillie explains. “You’d be surprised how long you can string competitors along without ever showing your cards.” An unsuspecting Yankowski pursued a takeover of RIM for months. Throughout Yankowski’s courtship of RIM, Balsillie downplayed his own company’s abilities and ambitions—flashing what he calls the “Aw, shucks card.” BlackBerry, he told Yankowski, was a small niche device lacking the global appeal of Palm. He talked of licensing Palm’s operating system and continually asked what RIM should do next. “That seemed to be his primary preoccupation,” Yankowski says. That’s exactly what RIM wanted him to think. “My objective,” comments Balsillie, “was to get him to underestimate RIM.” When Balsillie joined Yankowski in San Francisco for dinner later in 2000, the RIM chief pulled out a prototype of an upgraded BlackBerry, called the 957, which shared many of the features of the latest Palm device, including a large, square screen. He handed the model to Yankowski, who was suddenly full of questions: “What network will RIM use for this BlackBerry?” “We haven’t told anybody yet,” Balsillie replied. Eyeing the screen, Yankowski flashed Balsillie a big grin. “That’s okay. I already know.” “What do you mean?” “It says right here.” Yankowski pointed to the letters CDPD in the top right corner of the screen. CDPD, short for cellular digital packet data, was a wireless data network technology heavily promoted by its creator, AT&T. So that’s what RIM’s up to: dumping Mobitex for CDPD, Yankowski figured. Palm was already testing its next device on the CDPD data network. Balsillie was still giddy when he caught up with David Yach, a Canadian engineer who had been recently hired away from California software maker Sybase as RIM’s chief technology officer. Joining Yach in RIM’s jet, Balsillie blurted out: “He fell for it!” In fact, what he showed Yankowski earlier in the evening was a decoy with the screen changed to read CDPD by one of Yach’s engineers, with the specific intent of fooling the Palm boss. RIM had no interest in CDPD. Lazaridis viewed it as technically inferior technology, correctly predicting it would soon be dead. If Palm wanted to jump to CDPD, that was fine with Balsillie. For now, RIM was sticking with Mobitex, a slower but more reliable messaging highway. Yankowski has no recollection of the San Francisco dinner, but he remembers what happened soon afterward. Takeover talks broke off abruptly when Balsillie said he would have no part of a deal that did not hand him full executive control of the merged company. The petulant demand by a firm with one-twelfth the revenues of Palm seemed…"

Source:Losing the Signal

1 more highlight — primary source evidence for this entity is restricted to registered users.

Login to Access Archive

Appears In Volumes