Entity Dossier
Person

Paul Allen

Strategic Concepts & Mechanics

Identity & CultureOut-Behave to OutperformOperating PrincipleReflection Cycles Beat Relentless ExecutionImplementation TacticBig Rocks Fill the Jar FirstDecision FrameworkPulsing Captures Culture in Real TimeStructural VulnerabilityZombie OKRs Die Without Weekly Check-insImplementation TacticSubjective Self-Assessment Rescues Raw ScoresImplementation TacticThe OKR Shepherd Forces the FlockStrategic ManeuverTwo Baskets: Committed vs. MoonshotMental ModelAll Green Means You FailedRelationship LeverageSacred One-on-Ones as Culture InfrastructureImplementation TacticSell Your Reds, Don't Hide ThemCapital StrategyInternal Turnover Beats External AttritionMental Model10x Reframes the Problem, 10% Optimizes ItRisk DoctrineManager-to-Leader Transition BlindspotStrategic ManeuverDivorce Compensation from Goal ScoresStructural VulnerabilityStretch Snaps If Imposed from AboveStrategic ManeuverWatch Time Not Views: Pick the True CurrencyMental ModelLateral Linking Beats Cascading DownCompetitive AdvantageTransparency as Peer Accountability EngineMental ModelCFRs Are the Sinews, OKRs Are the BonesStrategic PatternStretch OKRs Trigger Infrastructure ResetsSignature MovePerot: Obscene Demands Until They Stop Saying NoSignature MoveBuffett: Insurance Float as a Super Margin AccountSignature MoveHuizenga: Close in the Stench Until They Say YesCornerstone MoveSteal the Playbook, Then Outrun the AuthorRisk DoctrineLuck Acknowledged Then Ruthlessly ExploitedIdentity & CultureJoy in the Chase Not the PrizeCapital StrategyHold Your Equity Until It Compounds Past Nine FiguresIdentity & CultureThick Skin Inherited or Forged by FireCornerstone MoveConsolidate Fragmented Industries at Blitzkrieg SpeedCornerstone MoveNobody Got Rich Watching from the StandsStrategic PatternHigh-Growth Industry as the Only On-RampCapital StrategyInsurance Float as Empire FoundationSignature MoveKerkorian: Sell Before the Peak, Never Pick the Bone CleanRelationship LeveragePolitical Access as Wealth Multiplier Not Wealth CreatorCornerstone MoveKeep the Back Door Open on Every BetOperating PrincipleFrugality as Permanent Competitive MoatSignature MoveWalton: Spy on Every Competitor Then Outwork Them AllSignature MoveRockefeller: Silent Desk, Then Swivel-Chair KnockoutMental ModelCompetition Is for Losers, Monopoly Is the GoalMental ModelThe Contrarian Truth Hidden Behind Popular DelusionRelationship LeveragePayPal Mafia as Culture ProofStrategic PatternSecrets Hide Where Nobody LooksStrategic ManeuverNail One Distribution Channel or DieIdentity & CultureFounders as Insider-Outsider ParadoxCapital StrategyEquity as Commitment FilterMental ModelPower Law Kills Diversification LogicMental ModelDefinite Optimism Beats Indefinite EverythingDecision FrameworkDurability Over Growth MetricsMental ModelSales Is Hidden or It Doesn't WorkMental ModelThe Company as Conspiracy to Change the WorldMental Model10x or Invisible: The Threshold for SwitchingStrategic ManeuverStart Tiny, Dominate, Then Expand ConcentricallyRisk DoctrineBoard Size as Governance WeaponOperating PrincipleOn the Bus or Off — No Half-CommitmentsMental ModelSeven Questions Every Business Must PassImplementation TacticLow CEO Pay as Alignment SignalRisk DoctrineFounding Alignment Is IrreversibleImplementation TacticOne Person, One Thing: Role Clarity Kills PoliticsMental ModelComputers Complement Humans, Never Replace ThemMental ModelLast Mover Wins the Whole MarketCornerstone MoveEquity Stakes for Distribution LeverageCompetitive AdvantageCableLabs Royalty-Free Standards PlayCornerstone MoveStock Architecture to Lock ControlCompetitive AdvantageBlackout as Franchise LeverageCapital StrategyTax-Sheltered Growing AnnuityCapital StrategyInsurance Company Capital Over BanksSignature MoveNever Bet the Whole FarmStrategic PatternWarrants as Industry Coordination CurrencyDecision FrameworkEmpathy as Negotiation ArchitectureSignature MoveThrow the Keys on the TableSignature MoveOwn a Small Piece of a Winner You Can't RunOperating PrincipleDecentralized Cowboys with Centralized BenchmarksRisk DoctrineWhat If Not as Decision FilterStrategic PatternScale Economics as Survival DoctrineSignature MoveAsk One Sharp Question to Crack Open IntelSignature MoveCash Flow Not Earnings as CurrencyCornerstone MoveBuy the System, Pay With Its Own Cash FlowIdentity & CultureIntrovert's Edge Through ListeningOperating PrincipleDenial as Quality ControlIdentity & CulturePrincipal or Employee, No Middle GroundSignature MoveInstinct Over Data as Decision DoctrineCornerstone MoveOne Dumb Step Then Course-Correct at SpeedOperating PrincipleCreative Conflict as Decision EngineDecision FrameworkSerendipity as Career Navigation SystemCornerstone MoveControl Hardwired or Walk AwaySignature MoveHire Sparky Blank Slates Over Credentialed VeteransCompetitive AdvantageContrarian Counterprogramming as Market EntryStrategic PatternScreens as Interactive Commerce SurfacesCornerstone MoveSeize Mismanaged Clay and Sculpt ItCapital StrategyCash the Lucky Check ImmediatelySignature MoveMaterial First, Never the PackageIdentity & CultureFearlessness Borrowed from Greater TerrorOperating PrincipleDrill to Molecular Understanding Before ActingSignature MoveSpin Out What You Build, Never Hoard ScaleSignature MoveTorture the Process Until Truth Rings

Primary Evidence

"Even before Paul Allen and I started the partnership, we were saying: A computer on every desk and in every home. IBM and other people—with resources and skill sets way beyond ours—weren’t aiming for that goal. They didn’t see it as a possibility, so they weren’t pushing as hard to make it a reality. But we could see that it would happen. Moore’s law would make things cheaper and get the software industry to critical mass. Those were big, big goals, and they started early for us. That was our biggest advantage: We aimed higher."

Source:Measure What Matters

"Steve Ballmer has similarly demonstrated the difference between billionaire-style risk taking and owning a diversified stock portfolio. In March 1989, Microsoft received an unfavorable ruling in its ongoing liti¬ gation with Apple Computer. The software company’s stock plummeted as investors fretted that Microsoft would be blocked from using certain Macintosh-like features in future versions of its Windows operating sys¬ tem. Sales chief Ballmer, who correctly foresaw that Apple would not ulti¬ mately prevail, shelled out $46 million to add to his existing large holdings of Microsoft stock. Three years later, he followed Bill Gates and Paul Allen into the billionaire ranks. By then, the Microsoft shares that Ballmer had purchased for $46 million at a low point in the company’s fortunes were worth more than $350 million."

Source:How to Be a Billionaire : Proven Strategies From the Titans of Wealth

"Over the years, Gates has occasionally embellished his own legend. He long claimed that his first 13 software customers had gone bankrupt, a tale that underscored the fierce competitiveness of the computer in¬ dustry. “I made that up,” he subsequently conceded.17 Gates also said that between 1970 and 1974, he and Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen developed a computer program that was eventually used in about half the elevators in the United States. This “never happened,” he later ac¬ knowledged.18 Additionally, Gates maintained that it was during the 1970-1974 period that he and Allen began using the phrase that they later repeated endlessly as Microsoft’s creed: “A computer on every desk and in every home, running Microsoft software.” In reality, no such company name existed at the time. The famous phrase, which ap¬ parently was not heard around Microsoft until the mid-1980s, evolved from a January 1975 Popular Electronics article heralding “the era of the computer in every home.”1"

Source:How to Be a Billionaire : Proven Strategies From the Titans of Wealth

"Malcolm Gladwell says you can’t understand Bill Gates’s success without understanding his fortunate personal context: he grew up in a good family, went to a private school equipped with a computer lab, and counted Paul Allen as a childhood friend. But perhaps you can’t understand Malcolm Gladwell without understanding his historical context as a Boomer (born in 1963)."

Source:Zero to One

"I was eager to get a toehold in the nascent industry. If you believe in the laws of attraction, they were working when I got a call from an investment banker who said Paul Allen, a cofounder of Microsoft, had around 25 percent of AOL stock—and now wanted to get out of it."

Source:Born to Be Wired

"“Let me tell you the whole story,” he began. The reason Paul Allen wanted to sell his block of AOL was to avoid a conflict of interest: Microsoft was about to come out with a new operating system that would directly compete with AOL. Bill cited Microsoft’s 90 percent share of the PC software market and said, “We will soon have our own web portal. It’s gonna be called The Microsoft Network—MSN—and it will be a dial-up internet service provider (ISP) tucked inside the release of Windows 95.” And then Bill Gates issued the real warning he wanted to convey: “And when we release this, it’s gonna be very difficult for customers that upgrade to Windows 95 to be able to find AOL… and we think Microsoft Network is gonna be a huge success. “So, you know, I don’t want you making the mistake of putting your money into something that we’re gonna put out of business.” This was rather brass knuckles of Bill, and sometimes this was his way; it is how you get to 90 percent market share of anything."

Source:Born to Be Wired

"Ticketmaster was a public company controlled by Paul Allen and run by a blustery caricature of a loudmouthed but incredibly effective lawyer named Fred Rosen, who had brashly led it to total domination of the ticketing business for live events throughout the world. Thank god he was a Luddite, or we wouldn’t have gotten the chance to buy it. When asked about the idea of putting ticket sales online, his reaction was “We’ll do it after everybody else does it. Right now it’s just a waste of resources.”"

Source:Who Knew

"I didn’t know any of this when I cold-called Paul, thinking he might find the idea of a combination of Ticketmaster and HSN compelling. He told me of his frustrations with Rosen, and how he believed the company should jump-start online ticketing. Eureka—that was the seed and… suddenly I did see the future and got so excited about the online possibilities that I couldn’t race fast enough to get a deal done. I told Paul that if he traded his stock in Ticketmaster for stock in HSN, I’d deal with Rosen and he could get out of that tortured relationship. I’d dealt all my life with far more obstreperous characters. Paul Allen quickly agreed and ended up with 11 percent of my company and joined our board. A year or so later he sold his shares, doubling his money (not that he needed it, but if he’d kept his shares, he’d have become far richer than the Midas he already was)."

Source:Who Knew

Appears In Volumes